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As our reliance on the Internet grows, our interconnected networks become more 
vulnerable to cyberattacks. Cyberattacks and other cyber threats can cause disastrous 
results, especially if a coordinated targeted attack hits multiple networks at the same time. 
For this reason, cyber information-sharing among public and private organizations 
becomes necessary and important to defend our networks. Many cyber threats are 
difficult to detect and identify by a single organization. Information sharing can help 
detect these potential risks, prevent cyberattacks, and facilitate incident response to better 
defend networks. Although the public and private sectors have begun to share 
cybersecurity information, there are still many barriers that stop agencies from sharing 
more. This research identifies and reviews what the barriers are to sharing cyber 
information and possible ways that the barriers can be overcome. 
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Society is increasingly dependent upon the Internet and the systems delivered through it. 
These systems help ensure that they deliver and maintain essential services in the face of 
attacks, failures, and accidents. Our critical infrastructure sector is reliant on networked 
environments for its daily operation. It is these systems that the consumer has come to 
rely on too in order to do their banking, purchase their goods, and extract money from 
ATM’s when needed. If any of these systems were to fail or be hacked by cyber 
criminals, the trust that consumers have in these systems will be altered and it would take 
a long time for the industry to rebuild that trust.   
President Obama has declared that the “cyber threat is one of the most serious 
economic and national security challenges we face as a nation” and that “America’s 
economic prosperity in the 21st century will depend on cybersecurity.”
1
 Our economy 
and national security depend on a secure cyberspace. One of the pillars of our nation’s 
cybersecurity strategy is to improve our resilience to cyber incidents and to reduce and 
defend against cyber threats.  
An important component of securing our IT infrastructure is the sharing of 
cybersecurity information between and among private entities. In particular, the sharing 
of information about cybersecurity threats, such as incident or threat reports, indicators, 
threat signatures, and alerts (collectively, “cyber threat information”) among these 
entities has the potential to greatly improve the safety of our systems. In his February 
2013 Executive Order, the President highlighted the important role the government can 
play in sharing information with private sector entities, while ensuring that privacy and 
civil liberties protections are in place.
2
 
Today, there are several projects underway where cyber threat information 
sharing is taking place, both informally and through formal exchange. Further, the sector-
1 The White House , “National Security Council Cybersecurity,” accessed August 1, 2013, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/cybersecurity.  
2 Exec. Order No. 13636, 78 C.F.R. 11739 (2013).  
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specific Information Sharing Analysis Centers (ISACs) have been established to advance 
the physical and cybersecurity of critical infrastructures and the recently published NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework is helping to increase sharing capabilities. 
There are many ways to share data. It can be structured or unstructured data. It 
can be shared via automated methods, manually, or both. There are many benefits to 
sharing cybersecurity related information including an increase in the security, 
availability, integrity, and efficiency of our information systems which leads to more 
secure networks.  
Given the importance of information sharing, this thesis sets out to examine the 
barriers to cybersecurity information sharing and how some of these barriers may be 
overcome. The information in this thesis draws from the review of available literature—
both academic and non-academic publications. The findings of this research are a step 
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After the attacks of September 11, 2001, two commissions concluded that 
information-sharing is a critical element for preventing terrorist attacks and for protecting 
the United States. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 
(9/11 Commission) concluded that information-sharing had not been a priority for the 
federal government before the attacks.1 The Markle Task Force was formed in 2002 to 
identify best practices in making information discoverable and accessible and enabling 
improved decision making with regard to threats against our nation. The Task Force 
found deficiencies in information sharing, and pushed for continued improvements in 
information sharing.2  
The need to share data, including cybersecurity information, among federal 
agencies is imperative. According to Michael Daniel, special assistant to the president 
and the cybersecurity coordinator, sharing threat information is critical to effective 
cybersecurity.3 Reducing barriers to information-sharing is a key element of the Obama 
administration’s strategy to improve the nation’s cybersecurity, and the administration is 
aggressively pursuing these efforts through both executive action and legislation.4  
Organizations need access to timely cyber threat information in order to detect, 
respond to, and protect against cyberattacks and cyber threats. Each federal agency has its 
own networks and data repositories that make it very difficult to piece together 
information that could collectively serve as a warning. As the White House’s 2009 
1National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 911 Commission Report: 
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), 567.  
2 Markle Foundation Task Force, Nation at Risk: Policy Makers Need Better Information to Protect 
the Country (New York: Markle Foundation, March 2009). 
3 Michael Daniel profile, The White House Blog, accessed September 2, 2014, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/author/Michael%20Daniel.  
4 Michael Daniel, “Getting Serious about Information Sharing for Cybersecurity,” The White House 
Blog, April 10, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/04/10/getting-serious-about-information-
sharing-cybersecurity.   
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Cyberspace Policy Review explained, “Information is key to preventing, detecting, and 
responding to cyber incidents. A full understanding and effective response may only be 
possible by bringing information from those various sources together for the benefit of 
all.”5 
The review identified enhanced information-sharing as a key component of 
effective cybersecurity, and the administration has made considerable progress in 
cybersecurity information sharing. For example, through support from the White House 
Cybersecurity Office within the National Security Council Staff (NSCS), the 
Comprehensive Cyber Security Initiative (CNCI) initiative number five (#5) connects the 
National Cyber Operations Centers and provides support for Enhanced Shared Situational 
Awareness (ESSA).6 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is working to 
develop the Enhanced Cybersecurity Services (ECS) program to share cyber information 
with private industry partners.7 But these endeavors, while facilitating greater 
cybersecurity information sharing, are just the beginning of this important initiative, and 
barriers still remain, limiting the ability of organizations to effectively and efficiently 
share. The barriers that have been noted by government and industry include such things 
as trust, legal, and technology.  
In the cybersecurity community, information-sharing is the act of exchanging 
cyber threat information between analysts to improve cyber network defenses.8 Trust 
between analysts and organizations are critical. Laws need to ensure that the privacy of 
citizens is upheld when information is exchanged, and the technology must be in place to 
enable secure machine–to-machine sharing of cybersecurity information. 
5 The White House, Cyberspace Policy Review: Assuring a Trusted and Resilient Information and 
Communications Infrastructure (Washington, DC: The White House, 2009).  
6 “Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative,” The White House, accessed September 9, 2014, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy/cybersecurity/national-initiative.  
7 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment for the Enhanced Cybersecurity 
Services (ECS) (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013). 
8 P. W. Singer and Allan Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar What Everyone Needs to Know (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 222–246.  
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B. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM  
Many experts agree that the terrorist attacks of 9/11 were caused, in part, by the 
inefficiency in the sharing of information.9 According to the National Strategy for 
Information Sharing and Safeguarding, “Our national security depends on our ability to 
share the right information, with the right people, at the right time.”10 There have been 
many initiatives to enable the sharing of information, such as the creation of the National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), but the focus has been on terrorism- and law 
enforcement-related information and not on cybersecurity.11 
Why is it important to share cybersecurity information?  In April 2012, the public 
disclosure of attempted attacks against natural gas pipeline company systems 
demonstrated the necessity—and the urgency—of better cyber-security information 
sharing.12 The coordinated attacks began in December 2011 but were not recognized and 
analyzed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) until March 2012 because 
information on these incidents was not reported to DHS in a timely manner.13 If 
stakeholders are provided with timely data on the most critical threats, they can use this 
information to implement an effective solution that will reduce the risk to their mission-
essential services. 
Furthermore, according to a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report 
from February 2013, threats to systems supporting critical infrastructure and federal 
9 Amy B. Zegart, Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2009).  
10 The White House Office, National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding 
(Washington, DC: The White House, December 2012).   
11 Richard A. Best, Jr., The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)—Responsibilities and 
Potential Congressional Concerns (CRS Report No. R41022) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, 2011).  
12 Mark Clayton, “Alert: Major Cyber Attack Aimed at Natural Gas Pipeline Companies,” Christian 
Science Monitor, May 5, 2012, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2012/0505/Alert-Major-cyber-attack-
aimed-at-natural-gas-pipeline-companies. 
13 Bipartisan Policy Center Cybersecurity Task Force, Cyber Security Task Force: Public-Private 
Information Sharing (Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2012), 5–6.  
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operations are evolving and growing.14 Federal agencies report an increase in the 
numbers of cybersecurity incidents that have placed sensitive information at risk, with 
potentially serious impacts on federal and military operations; critical infrastructure; and 
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of sensitive government, private sector, and 
personal information.15 The increasing risks are demonstrated by the dramatic increase in 
reports of security incidents, the ease of obtaining and using hacking tools, and steady 
advances in the sophistication and effectiveness of attack technology.16 
Information-sharing, timely analysis and warnings continue to challenge efforts to 
detect, respond to, and mitigate cybersecurity incidents, even though improvements in 
cybersecurity information sharing have become a higher priority. There are significant 
barriers that are impeding the progress of a more complete information-sharing approach. 
Most experts agree that there are vast benefits with sharing cybersecurity information and 
that the barriers must be addressed. In a recent book, for example, P.W. Singer and Allan 
Friedman of the Brookings Institution write that the key benefit of information-sharing is 
that it allows a more complete view of emerging threats and patterns.17 They point out 
that it arms analysts with the lessons learned from other analysts’ experiences. Beyond 
empowering the decision makers, information-sharing also benefits organizations and 
analysts by supporting the diffusion of experience and best practices of each 
organization.18  
C. BACKGROUND  
In recent years, cyber exploitation and malicious activity are becoming 
increasingly sophisticated, targeted, and serious.  The 2013 Internet Security Threat 
Report by Symantec Corporation identified a 42% increase in targeted attacks from 
14 Government Accountability Office, Cybersecurity National Strategy, Roles, and Responsibilities 
Need to Be Better Defined and More Effectively Implemented (GAO-13-187) (Washington, DC: 
Government Accountability Office, February 2013).  
15 Ibid., 10. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Singer and Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar, 222–246.   
18 Ibid. 
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2012.19 In addition, there were over 5,000 new vulnerabilities identified in 2013.20 Of the 
new vulnerabilities, 415 were on mobile operating systems and 69% were email 
vulnerabilities that were delivered to inboxes as spam.21 One in 400 of the spam emails 
were identified as phishing emails, and 1 in 300 were identified as viruses.22  
According to experts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the 
greatest threat that DHS must defend against in the coming years will come not from a 
physical opponent, but from cyberspace.23 This threat will only continue to grow as our 
reliance on technology continues to evolve at a rapid rate and state and non-state actors 
increasingly invest in cyber capabilities. The danger posed by cyberattacks extends not 
only to critical infrastructure systems such as the power grid and water systems but also 
to the nation’s economy. Equally, if not more, worrying than the potential for a 
catastrophic “cyber Pearl Harbor,” as described by former Defense Secretary Leon 
Panetta, is the ongoing theft of intellectual property from U.S. corporations and 
businesses.24 As noted by General Keith Alexander, former commander of United States 
Cyber Command and director of the National Security Agency, intellectual property theft 
represent “the greatest transfer of wealth in history.” This theft not only leeches billions 
of dollars from the nation’s economy each year, but also grants potential adversaries 
access to sensitive information regarding U.S. technologies, including those related to 
national security. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 
one of DHS’ greatest challenges in the coming years will be to protect against these 
attacks and intrusions. In doing so, DHS must establish enhanced systems for improved 
intelligence and information-sharing.25 





23 Rick Nelson and Rob Wise, “Homeland Security at a Crossroads: Evolving DHS to Meet the Next 
Generation of Threats,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 1, 2013, 
http://csis.org/publication/homeland-security-crossroads-evolving-dhs-meet-next-generation-threats.   
24 Elisabeth Bumiller and Thom Shanker, “Panetta Warns of Dire Threat of Cyberattack on U.S.,” 
New York Times, October 11, 2012.  
25 Nelson and Wise, “Homeland Security at a Crossroads.”  
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The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) recently warned 
of the threat of rising cyber-attacks within the financial services critical infrastructure 
sector.26 These attacks target bank websites and cash machines, prompting a rise in 
denial-of-service attacks that sometimes are a cover for criminals committing fraud. The 
council urged the industry to put proper measures in place to guard against this type of 
fraud. It described one recent case in which criminals stole $40 million from just 12 
accounts—far exceeding the actual balance held by clients—in a sophisticated scheme 
known as an “unlimited operations” fraud.27 
In addition to these threats, another threat called the Advanced Persistent Threat 
(APT) has been spreading across government and defense contractor networks. Mandiant 
Corporation published the Mandiant APT report in March 2013. This report describes the 
nature of the APT threat and where it is originating.28  The report analyzes hundreds of 
investigations that signal that the groups conducting these security breaches around the 
world are based primarily in China. 
Cyber threat information from these types of threats is what stakeholders need in 
order to implement effective solutions that will reduce the risk to mission-essential 
services and data. Organizations currently employ their own defensive measures to 
protect their network infrastructures. With the emergence of a wide variety of 
sophisticated cyber threats, this has made these disconnected efforts a liability. To 
prevent the sophisticated adversary, the baseline security posture of the entire 
organization should be unified through the improved information-sharing of relevant and 
actionable cyber threat information. In order to do this, experts agree that organizations 
need to reach out and partner with both private industry and federal organizations and 
26 Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC), Cyber-Attacks on Financial 
Institutions’ ATM and Card Authorization Systems (Washington, DC: Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council, April 2, 2014). 
27 “Financial Regulators Release Statements on Cyber-Attacks on Automated Teller Machine and 
Card Authorization Systems and Distributed Denial of Service Attacks,” FFIEC (Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council), April 2, 2014, http://www.ffiec.gov/press/pr040214.htm. 
28 Mandiant, APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units (Alexandria, VA: Mandiant, 
2013).  
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share threat information, enhance their cyber situational awareness, and protect their 
networks.29 
1. The Cyber Threat 
Network risks stem from cybercrime, threats from inside the organization, threats 
to critical infrastructure, and threats from nation state actors that steal information for 
economic gain.30 Cybercrime and cyberattacks are genuine threats. Reports of data 
breaches, hacks, or thefts have become daily news.31 Therefore, the data about the 
adversaries and threats are the critical and must be shared.   
In recent years, cyber exploitation and malicious activity in the United States are 
becoming increasingly sophisticated, targeted, and serious.32 The 2014 U.S. State of 
Cybercrime Survey found that American businesses and institutions are failing to meet 
the cybersecurity threats posed by hackers at home and abroad.33 According to the report, 
it is clear that the cybersecurity programs of U.S. organizations do not rival the 
persistence, tactical skills, and technological prowess of their potential cyber adversaries.   
Today, common criminals, organized crime rings, and nation-states leverage 
sophisticated techniques to launch attacks that are highly targeted and difficult to detect. 
In fact, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence has ranked cybercrime as the top 
national security threat, higher than that of terrorism, espionage, and weapons of mass 
destruction.34 The report also found that in a volatile cybercrime environment, attackers 
continually and rapidly update their tactics to maintain an advantage over any security 
29 Singer and Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar, 222–246. 
30 Cyber Attacks: An Unprecedented Threat to U.S. National Security House of Representative: 
Hearing before Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, 113th Cong., 2, 1, (2013). 
31 Steven Titch, “U.S. Cybersecurity Policy: Problems and Principles,” The Heartland Institute, 
August 1, 2013, http://heartland.org/policy-documents/us-cybersecurity-policy-problems-and-principles.  
32 Kevin Mickelberg, Neal Pollard and Laurie Schive, 2014 U.S. State of Cybercrime, London: 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, June 2014. http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/increasing-it-
effectiveness/publications/assets/2014-us-state-of-cybercrime.pdf.  
33 Mickelberg, Pollard and Schive, 2014 U.S. State of Cybercrime. 
34  Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National Security of the United States, Remarks 
Delivered to the Senate Armed Services Committee (2014) (statement of James R. Clapper, director of 
National Intelligence).  
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safeguard such as anti-virus protection. Recently, for instance, hackers engineered a new 
round of distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks that can generate traffic rated at a 
staggering 400 gigabits per second, the most powerful DDoS assaults to date.35 
One of the most recent and high profile attacks was the November 2013 Point of 
Sale (POS) attack on Target Corporation. A cyberattack compromised up to 40 million 
payment cards during the first three weeks of the holiday shopping season.36 The 
malware was used in conjunction with a variety of other tools, and the criminals 
displayed a high degree of skill in orchestrating the various components of the 
breaches.37  
Financially motivated cyber criminals have used POS malware at an accelerating 
pace for several years. POS malware that includes memory-scraping capabilities has been 
available for some time.38 The malicious software that enabled hackers to steal 
information from credit and debit cards from November 27 to December 15 was later 
found on 25 additional checkout machines and continued to collect shoppers’ information 
for three more days.39 On December 27, Target also acknowledged, contrary to early 
reports, that personal identification numbers to debit and credit cards were also exposed. 
During the process of this attack, Target remained operational both through its brick-and-
mortar stores as well as its website.   
The Target case is indicative of growing threat of cyberattacks. It is important to 
understand the vulnerabilities locally and globally, and how other governments respond 
to these kinds of attacks.   
35 Mickelberg, Pollard and Schive, 2014 U.S. State of Cybercrime, 21.  
36 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration 
Center (NCCIC), United States Secret Service (USSS), Financial Sector Information Sharing and Analysis 
Center (FS-ISAC), and iSIGHT Partners. POS Malware Technical Analysis: Indicators for Network 
Defenders (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, January 16, 2014.)  
37 DHS, NCCIC, USSS, FS-ISAC and iSight, POS Malware Technical Analysis.  
38 Ibid. 
39 Michael Riley et al., “Target Missed Warnings in Epic Hack of Credit Card Data,” Business Week, 
March 13, 2014, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-03-13/target-missed-alarms-in-epic-hack-of-
credit-card-data. 
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To defend against threats, cybersecurity analysts and leaders must assess the risks 
they face. Herbert Lin, the chief scientist for Computer Science at the National 
Academies and one of the leading experts in the field of cybersecurity, explains that the 
threat is evaluated on three basic factors:  “The feasibility of adversaries being able to 
identify and exploit your vulnerabilities, the effect that would happen if they were able to 
take advantage of these vulnerabilities, and finally, the likelihood that they will, in fact, 
be willing to do so.”40 
There is general consensus among practitioners that systems and networks are 
inherently vulnerable, and they offer a wide array of opportunities for criminal or cyber 
terrorist organizations to exploit these intrinsic weaknesses.41 Cybersecurity analysts 
have long tried to get ahead of the adversaries, principally by analyzing the cyber threat 
information that is provided to them through such means as cyber threat websites and 
trusted partners through the sharing of information.  
Singer and Friedman insist that the approach to sharing must be about the data.42 
They assert that many things can happen, but someone must cause them. Threats should 
be assessed by understanding potential bad actors, what they are trying to do, and why. 
They suggest that when sharing, information stakeholders ask questions such as what 
type of indicators are we sharing from the cyber information, where did it originate from, 
and when did it occur?  These types of questions could provide answers to more 
actionable information that can be shared. 
Cybersecurity experts refer to this data as “cyber threat intelligence.”43 This is a 
key part of an organization’s defense against cyber adversaries. Examples of cyber threat 
intelligence include understanding and characterizing such information as what sort of 
attack actions have occurred or are likely to occur; how can these actions be detected and 
40Seymour E. Goodman and Herbert S. Lin, eds., Toward a Safer and More Secure Cyberspace 
(Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2007). 
41 Sylvester Ngoma, “Vulnerability of IT Infrastructures: Internal and External Threats,” Congo 
Vision, accessed September 13, 2014, www.congovision.com/IT-Security-Pub.pdf, congovision.com. 
42 Singer and Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar, 222–246. 
43 Mitre, “Structured Threat Information eXpression—STIX. A Structured Language for Cyber Threat 
Intelligence Information,” accessed December 2, 2013, http://measurablesecurity.mitre.org/docs/stix-intro-
handout.pdf .  
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recognized; how can they be mitigated; who are the relevant threat actors; what are they 
trying to achieve; what are their capabilities, in the form of tactics, techniques, and 
procedures they have leveraged over time and are likely to leverage in the future; what 
sort of vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, or weaknesses they are likely to target; what 
actions have they taken in the past; etc.44 
2. National Sharing Initiatives 
The Obama administration has launched several initiatives, including the 
Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative Priority Number-5 (CNCI-5) for 
enhanced situational awareness of the federal cyber centers, Executive Order (EO) 13636 
for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, and Presidential Policy Directive 
(PPD-21), which is a companion to the EO.45 CNCI-5 was created to connect current 
cyber operations centers to enhance situational awareness. Out of this effort came the 
Enhance Shared Situational Awareness (ESSA) initiative that will provide the real-time 
cybersecurity situational awareness to improve the security of the U.S. government and 
U.S. critical infrastructure.  Through this initiative the federal cybersecurity centers 
agreed to an information sharing framework, and shared situational awareness (SSA) 
requirements to facilitate development and implementation of the ESSA Information 
Sharing Architecture (ISA).46  
According to a report by the GAO in 2010, the CNCI-5 could do a better job 
addressing international efforts by improving cooperation between cybersecurity and law 
enforcement professionals in different nations, developing security standards, and 
pursuing international agreements on engagement and information sharing.47 As of today, 
44 Ibid.  
45 “Fact Sheet: Executive Order (EO) 13636 Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity and 
Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-21 Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience,” Department of 
Homeland Security, March 2013, http://www.dhs.gov/publication/fact-sheet-eo-13636-improving-critical-
infrastructure-cybersecurity-and-ppd-21-critical.  
46 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Information Sharing Environment 2014 Annual 
Report to the Congress (Washington, DC:  Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2014) 
http://www.ise.gov/annual-report/section4.html. 
47 Government Accountability Office, Cybersecurity: Progress made but Challenges Remain in 
Defining and Coordinating the Comprehensive National Initiative (GAO 10–338) (Washington, DC: 
Government Accountability Office, 2010).  
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the initiative is making great strides in the areas of developing standards, but the focus is 
still on connecting federal cyber centers and not on national or international cyber 
operations centers.48 
There are other initiatives that are working to provide information to only Internet 
service providers (ISPs) and Defense Industry Board (DIB) partners.49 Although these 
systems are working to solve part of the problem, there is still a gap in sharing this 
information to organizations that do not have the proper clearance level, such as the 
private sector community as well as the general public. One such system is the Enhanced 
Cybersecurity Services (ECS) initiative that is supposed to expand the number of 
companies that receive classified or top secret information from the government about 
real or potential threats.50 The problem with this initiative is that to date, few companies 
have decided to make the investment. ECS is a voluntary program and the government 
does fund it. Businesses must decide if it makes sense to invest in a secure facility and in 
network upgrades to handle classified data.51 
In addition to the CNCI-5 efforts, the EO expands information-sharing and 
collaboration between the government and the private sector, and establishes a process 
for identifying critical infrastructure (CI) with high priority for protection.52 It requires 
National Institutes of Standards and Technology (NIST) to lead in the development of a 
framework of cybersecurity standards and best practices for protecting CI and requires 
regulatory agencies to establish requirements to address the risks. The companion PPD-
48 “Meeting Minutes,” Information Security and Privacy Advisory Board, accessed September 2, 
2014, http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/ispab/documents/minutes/2013-
12/ispab_meeting_minutes_december2013.pdf.  
49 Milton Mueller and Andreas Kuehn, “Einstein on the Breach: Surveillance Technology, 
Cybersecurity and Organizational Change,” paper Presented the 12th Workshop on the Economics of 
Information Security (WEIS 2013),Georgetown University, Washington, DC, June 11–12, 2013. 
50 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Privacy Impact Assessment for the Enhanced 
Cybersecurity Services, Washington, DC: DHS, January 16, 2013.   
51 Jason Miller, “DHS Finds Classified Cyber Sharing Program Slow to Take Off,” accessed October 
5, 2013, http://www.federalnewsradio.com/index.php?nid=851&sid=3356694.  
52 “Presidential Policy Directive—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience,” The White House, 
February 21, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-
critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil. 
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21 revises other aspects of policy relating to CI security with the aim of improving 
integration and efficiency, among other goals.53  
According to the National Infrastructure Advisory Council, having national unity 
of effort to strengthen and maintain a secure, functioning, and resilient infrastructure 
requires broad participation, collaboration, and trust.54 The council intends to measure the 
effectiveness of the EO and PPD work by utilizing metrics that were developed by the 
Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute.55 Future research can include the 
review of these metrics as these initiatives are put into operation. 
According to the White House, there are many companies who are already 
sharing information on cyber threats with each other and with the government through 
programs that preserve the privacy of Americans, maintain appropriate constraints on 
government access to private information, and do not lead to anti-competitive practices.56  
For example, during the denial-of-service attacks that targeted the websites of many 
leading U.S. banks over the last few years, the Financial Services Information Sharing 
and Analysis Center coordinated with banks to exchange information to manage the 
attacks.57 Also, Boston’s Advanced Cybersecurity Center, the Bay Area Security 
Council, and ChicagoFirst have built smaller trust networks. The White House continues 
to work with partners in industry to encourage information sharing partnerships and to 
take to further reduce barriers to information sharing.58  
53 “Presidential Policy Directive—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience.” 
54 “Executive Order and PPD-21 Working Group Recommendations for Maximum Engagement 
Including the Cybersecurity Framework, in Reducing Cyber Risks to Critical Infrastructure,”  National 
Infrastructure Advisory Council, September 4, 2013, 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/WG%20Adoption%20Recomendations.pdf.  
55 Matthew H. Fleming and Eric Goldstein, Metrics for Measuring the Efficacy of Critical-
Infrastructure-Centric Cybersecurity Information Sharing Efforts (Washington, DC: Homeland Security 
Studies and Analysis Institute, 2012).   
56 Michael Daniel, “Getting Serious about Information Sharing for Cybersecurity.” 
57 Data Security: Examining Efforts to Protect Americans’ Financial Information Hearing Before the 
House Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, 
113th Cong., 2nd Sess (2014) (statement of William Noonan, USSS Criminal Investigative Division 




                                                 
D. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
This thesis argues that overcoming the barriers to cyber threat information-sharing 
will help protect American networks from cyberattacks. It addresses barriers tied to trust, 
technology and law, identifies recent technological advances, and examines ways to 
overcome the barriers. Furthermore, this thesis reviews the federal cybersecurity 
information-sharing initiatives and how they may or may not be making progress, as well 
as the efficacy of emerging standards and technology for cybersecurity information-
sharing. 
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research explores the questions, what are the primary barriers to cyber 
information sharing between government and private sector organizations?  And, how 
can these barriers be overcome?  The intent of this research is to help inform policy 
makers about the problems that prevent better sharing of cybersecurity information and 
make our cyber information more secure.   
To examine these questions, this thesis uses a qualitative method of analysis tool 
known as NVivo and observational evaluation to identify the strengths and weaknesses of 
cybersecurity information-sharing with an emphasis on those already identified by 
government and industry. 
Literature sources, such as government documents, books, and websites, were 
used to perform this study. The literature sources were imported into a software product 
called NVivo version 10 and thematically coded and analyzed to find emerging themes. 
NVivo is a Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) tool that 
was developed by QSR International.59 CAQDAS tools are used to assist in identifying 
patterns and relationships and to interpret the data. This analysis provides further review 
and evidence of the question on what the barriers are to cybersecurity information-
sharing. The process of the research plan for using the software for the analysis is 
described in Figure 1. Handling qualitative data tends to be an iterative process whereby 
59 “Using NVivo for Qualitative Research,” QSR International, accessed June 30, 2014, http://help-
nv10.qsrinternational.com/desktop/concepts/using_nvivo_for_qualitative_research.htm. 
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the process of the research contains the steps for exploring, coding, reflecting, and taking 
memos. The process is repeated by coding more, querying the data, and so on. This will 
be further described in Chapter III. 
 
Figure 1.  Research plan60 
In her book, How to Write a Master’s Thesis, Bui describes how tools such as 
NVivo, HyperRESEARCH, and HyperTRANSCRIBE are often used to help code and 
analyze qualitative data.61 CAQDAS tools such as NVivo have been used in previous 
research at Naval Postgraduate School. For example, Leslie Sekerka, Roxanne Zolin, and 
Cary Simon used NVivo software to assist with theme development and facilitate coding 
60 Ibid.  
61 Yvonne N. Bui, How to Write a Master’s Thesis (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2013).  
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in their 2005 thesis, “Rapid Transformation in a Dual Identity Defense University.”62 In 
2013, Tiffany Smythe used NVivo to develop a report on a study of the response to 
Hurricane Sandy. The software and the coding helped her identify text relevant to the 
research question of what plans were in place prior to the hurricane and to identify 
lessons learned.63 
In addition, there have been research projects in other universities that utilized the 
NVivo software to help with research. For example, Caroline Bartle of the University of 
West England utilized NVivo to develop her doctoral thesis on “Spreading the Word:  A 
Social-Psychological Exploration of Word-of-Mouth Traveler Information in the Digital 
Age.”  Bartle used a thematic analysis of website contributions, questionnaire responses 
and interviews, and applied the NVivo software to code from these sources.64  
Another example of the use of the software was from Xiao Fu of Durham 
University. Fu used the software in his thesis, The Influences of Budgetary System in a 
Selection of Large Chinese Companies in the Industry of Electronic Household 
Appliances,” to study companies’ everyday business activities. The author reviewed 
budgetary systems, the relationships that can be discovered between employees’ concepts 
and behaviors concerning them, and the reasons behind these. By answering these 
questions, Fu found that when you look into Chinese companies’ budgetary practices, the 
understanding provided by Western budgetary studies were relevant. To perform the 
research, Fu used NVivo to code the data, group the data until clues, threads, 
relationships, reasons, and answers became evident.65 
62 Leslie E. Sekerka, Roxanne Zolin and Cary Simon, Rapid Transformation in a Dual Identity 
Defense University (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2005).  
63 Tiffany C. Smythe, Assessing the Impacts of Hurricane Sandy on the Port of New York and New 
Jersey’s Maritime Responders and Response Infrastructure (Boulder, CO: Natural Hazards Center, 2013). 
64 Caroline Bartle, “Spreading the Word: A Social-Psychological Exploration of Word-of-Mouth 
Traveler Information in the Digital Age,” master’s thesis, University of the West of England, 2011, 
http://www2.uwe.ac.uk/faculties/FET/Research/cts/projects/reports/bartle_2011_thesis.pdf. 
65 Xiao Fu, “The Influences of Budgetary System in a Selection of Large Chinese Companies in the 
Industry of Electronic Household Appliances” (master’s thesis, Durham University, 2012) 
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3644/1/Xiao_Fu_Upload_Thesis.pdf?DDD2+. 
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The rest of the thesis will proceed as follows. Chapter II is the literature review 
and provides an overview of the problem and the barriers to cyber information-sharing. 
Chapter III explains how the analysis was performed. In this case, the software tool called 
NVivo was used to do a qualitative analysis of the literature sources. Chapter IV, the 
results, covers what was found as the results of the question in the research. Finally, 
Chapter V provides a discussion of the results and recommendations. 
F. LIMITATIONS 
As previously discussed, this study encompasses the barriers to cybersecurity 
information sharing to include policies, legal issues, trust as well as other shortcomings in 
areas such as technology. The quality of the findings of this study is limited to an 
evaluation of qualitative information obtained from literature sources. There was no 
formal survey or interviews from direct sources for this study. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This literature review addresses research related to the barriers of cyber 
information-sharing between government and private sector organizations. Although 
there are some projects identified that are in the process of developing systems to 
improve cyber threat information-sharing, there are still considerable factors that are 
making it hard to share more. The review of these factors will provide insight in order to 
overcome these barriers for a more successful approach. 
B. ANALYSIS 
Experts note that the private sector has difficulty in sharing its cyber threat 
indicators and incidents with the government.66 This is especially true when a cyber 
incident would threaten the livelihood of that corporation.67 For instance, if an incident 
reveals that the company’s customers are vulnerable due to the incident, the sharing of 
the information could hold the company liable therefore, the company is reluctant to 
share it.68 Problems like this are just one example of the barriers to sharing cyber 
information. These problems date back to the beginning of networked systems and when 
cybersecurity breaches began. 
More than ten years ago, an expert from Symantec Corporation identified three 
specific impediments that hinder cybersecurity information-sharing in the United States: 
lack of trust, concerns over the protection of shared information, and failure by the 
government to share their threat information in return.69 Just last November, Phyllis 
Schneck, deputy under secretary for cybersecurity for the National Protection and 
66 David Sutton, “The Issue of Trust and Information Sharing and the Question of Public Private 
Partnerships,” in Critical Information Infrastructure Protection and Resilience in the ICT Sector (Hershey, 
PA: IGI Global, 2013), 258–276. 
67Sutton, “The Issue of Trust and Information Sharing, 258–276.  
68 Ibid. 
69 Adam Rak, “Information Sharing in the Cyber Age: A Key to Critical Infrastructure Protection,” 
Information Security Technical Report 7, no. 2 (June 2002).  
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Programs Directorate of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, spoke about some of 
same impediments that are still identified as problems to cyber information-sharing.70 
For this reason, it is important to find out why the impediments endure and what can be 
done to fix them. 
There have been many studies done on collaborative sharing of information and 
trust. For example, in a study done by the European Network and Information Security 
Agency (ENISA), it was noted that formal means for sharing information should be set 
up in order to improve the protection and rapid restoration of infrastructure critical to the 
reliability of communications within and throughout Europe.71 In a different study by 
Mitre Corporation, it was determined that information and communication technologies 
(ICT) are increasingly intertwined across the economies and societies of developed 
countries.72 Protecting these technologies from cyber threats requires collaborative 
relationships for exchanging cyber defense information and an ability to establish trusted 
relationships.73 
Scholars identify cyber information as an asset of knowledge. The development of 
these knowledge assets and protection of them are both complementary and competing 
concerns for an organization. Each has specific issues related to trust that need to be 
understood and addressed before an organization is willing to share them.74 
In the book Collaborative Computer Security and Trust Management, the authors 
suggest an attitude among scholars whereby knowledge assets should be collected and 
then shared among practitioners, fully leveraging their impact. There is an implicit 
assumption that all network partners are trustworthy, both individuals and organizations, 
70 Brandan Blevins, “Experts Propose Better Cybersecurity Information-Sharing Models,” Search 
Security, November 14, 2013, http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/news/2240209036/Experts-propose-
better-cybersecurity-information-sharing-models. 
71 Neil Robinson and Emma Disley, Incentives and Challenges for Information Sharing (Heraklion, 
Greece: European Network and Information Security Agency, 2010). 
72 D. Fernandez Vazquez et al., “Conceptual Framework for Cyber Defense Information Sharing 
within Trust Relationships” presented at the 2012 4th International Conference on Cyber Conflict, Tallinn, 
Estonia, June 5–8, 2012. 
73 Ibid.  
74Jean-Marc Seigneur and Adam Slagell, eds., Collaborative Computer Security and Trust 
Management (Hershey, PA: Information Science Reference, 2009), 1–11.  
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and that fuller distribution of knowledge is always better.75 The book indicates that this is 
not always the case and further exploration of this subject area will identify why. 
According to experts at the School of Information Sciences and Technology at the 
Pennsylvania State University, the primary reason for the hesitation to share sensitive 
information among agencies is a lack of trust.76 They discuss conflict of interests and turf 
battles between agencies, and assert that the problem can cause substantial deficiencies. 
They conclude that existing secure information sharing technologies and protocols cannot 
provide enough incentives for government agencies to share information with one 
another without jeopardizing their own interests.77  
When multiple stakeholders are involved in collaboration, it is typical for their 
priorities to differ, or even conflict, with one another. In today’s increasingly networked 
world, cybersecurity collaborations may span organizations and countries. There are 
items identified that may lead to more trusting cybersecurity information-sharing and 
collaboration.78 For example, the European Network and Information Security Agency 
(ENISA) published a paper on cyber information-sharing and found that the most popular 
structure to facilitate this sharing is a trusted’ forum or platform where private sector 
infrastructure owners or operators can meet face-to-face at regular intervals and hold 
informal, un-attributable discussions.79 
Researchers from MITRE Corporation and ISDEFE, a defense and security firm 
from Spain, published a report for the 2012 4th International Conference on Cyber 
Conflict (CYCON). They used the ENISA processes and documents to identify four 
aspects of cyber defense collaboration and improvements to cyber information-sharing. 
According to the report, there is a long history across the cyber defense community of 
establishing information-sharing repositories, creating data exchange standards, and 
75 Ibid. 
76 Peng Liu and Amit Chetal, “Trust-Based Secure Information Sharing between Federal Government 
Agencies,” Journal of the Association for Information Science and Technology, no. 56 (2005): 283–298.  
77Liu and Chetal, “Trust-Based Secure Information Sharing,” 283–298. 
78 Seigneur and Slagell, Collaborative Computer Security, 1–11.  
79 Ibid. 
 19 
                                                 
finding that the repositories were underutilized.80 They found that in relation to the field 
of cybersecurity, the debate is about the data types that are useful, what data can be 
shared due to policies, what models to use to share, and how to address privacy and 
security.   
This thesis will include a study of the legal barriers to cybersecurity information-
sharing. Without legal protection, corporations worry that information they share may be 
used as evidence by the government or in litigation that might come back to haunt 
them.81 There have been groups that have asked Congress for legal protection prior to 
participating in any federal programs. Possible barriers may exist in current laws 
protecting electronic communications or in antitrust law.  
Organizations that share information may also be concerned that sharing or 
receiving such information may lead to increased civil liability, or that shared 
information may contain proprietary or confidential information that may be exposed to 
unauthorized use by competitors or government regulators.82 
These legal implications have fueled debates among lawmakers and industry, 
suggesting that there is a great need for new laws to protect organizations from such 
liability. Proposed laws such as the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act 
(CISPA) would allow for the sharing of Internet traffic information between the U.S. 
government and technology and manufacturing companies.83 The bill would help the 
U.S. government investigate cyber threats and ensure the security of networks against 
cyberattacks. Unfortunately, new laws such as this have yet to be implemented because 
others disagree that enough privacy protection will be included in the laws.84 
80 Robinson and Disley, Incentives and Challenges for Information Sharing. 
81 Singer and Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar, 222–246. 
82 “ITI Recommendation: Addressing Liability Concerns Impeding More Effective Cybersecurity 
Information Sharing,” Information Technology Industry Council, accessed September 2, 2014, 
http://www.itic.org/dotAsset/fae2feab-7b0e-45f4-9e74-64e4c9ece132.pdf. 
83 HR 624 Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, (2013).  
84Ibid. 
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In addition to legal barriers, this thesis will review policy barriers to cyber 
information-sharing. The debate includes organizational and national policies about what 
can be shared. Policies must exist within organizations to be able to share their data with 
other organizations. In reviewing the literature associated with cyber information-sharing 
and policy development, there are multiple areas where sources have identified a 
requirement for Congress to develop new policies for sharing cyber-threat information. 
Sharon Dawes proposes a theoretical model for understanding how policy, practice, and 
attitudes interact and suggests two policy principles, stewardship and usefulness, to 
promote the benefits and mitigate the risks of sharing.85 
According to Dawes, successful sharing depends on a policy that takes a global 
view of how information resources can support government services. It should convey an 
affirmative expectation that government information be used to increase knowledge, 
improve analysis, and inform decisions as well as to administer programs. Any 
jurisdiction seeking the benefits of interagency information-sharing must adopt policies 
that do more than simply make sharing possible. It needs policies that make it probable 
that appropriate problems will be identified and that reasonable effort will lead to 
success. Dawes suggests two policy principles, information stewardship and information 
use.86 These policy principles will be discussed later in this thesis.   
The Mitre report includes trust-building policies as a way to building trust and has 
two components.87 First, participants will develop trust in the cyber defense sharing 
network as participants feel that the information they contribute is protected. Second, the 
network provides them the opportunity to gather valuable information unavailable 
elsewhere, providing high value back to participants. 
Technology for automated information-sharing is another barrier to sharing cyber 
information, but there are initiatives working to close the technology gap. In order to 
85 Sharon S. Dawes, “Interagency Information Sharing: Expected Benefits, Manageable Risks,” 
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 15, no. 3 (1996): 377–394. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Vazquez et al., “Conceptual Framework for Cyber Defense Information Sharing,” 1–17. 
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share information, there must be a common language and format of how and what to 
share. Standards on information security have been around for a long time. For example,  
The standards that are needed for sharing cyber threat information are fairly new 
and not widely adopted yet. For example, there are the NIST SP-800 standards for 
security information systems. There are also the ISO/IEC 27000 series of standards that 
are part of a growing family of ISO/IEC Information Security Management Systems 
(ISMS) standards.88 Several emerging cyber security standards show early promise. Two 
of them, the Structured Threat Indicator Exchange (STIX) and Incident Object 
Description Exchange Format (IODEF) could potentially play a pivotal role in protecting 
threat-related communication between sharing partners. Furthermore, there are 
overlapping standards that are causing problems for some agencies. For instance, five 
years ago, there were no known cyber structured standards available to exchange cyber 
threat information, but there are now overlapping cyber-sharing standards that compete 
for use within organizations.89 According to Kathleen Moriarty of EMC Corporation, 
threat information-sharing efforts must affect the most efficient response, and in doing so, 
it must ensure the threats shared are actionable. She goes on to mention that there needs 
to be an efficient automated sharing model developed.90 She argues that if multiple 
overlapping standards are developed, the automation of cyber threat information becomes 
a barrier to successful sharing. This thesis builds upon her work and attempts to identify 
ways to unify standards development in order to have a more consistent approach for 
cyber standards.  
Other barriers to cyber information-sharing have been identified such as personnel 
clearance levels and the need to access classified cyber information, concerns with the 
value of the data once it is shared, and fears that automated sharing could lead to the 
88 Yves Barlette and Vladislav V. Fomin, “The Adoption of Information Security Management 
Standards,” in Information Resources Management: Concepts, Methodologies, Tools, and Applications 
(Hershey, PA: IGI Global, 2010), 69   




                                                 
release of too much information.91  According to U.S. federal classification guidance 
policy, information shall not be considered for classification unless its unauthorized 
disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause identifiable or describable damage to 
the United States’ national security, and if it pertains to things such as military plans, 
weapons systems or operations, foreign government information, intelligence activities 
and others.92 Policies such as these prevent the sharing of cyber threat information.   
According to a Government Information Quarterly report by Harold C. Relyea, the 
federal government has not established comprehensive policies to effectively integrate state 
and city governments into the information-sharing process. According to the report, the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) identified several barriers to sharing threat 
information with state and city governments. For example, federal agencies say they could 
not provide states and cities with information due to concerns over state and local officials’ 
ability to secure and protect classified information, the officials’ lack of security clearances, 
and the lack of integrated databases. GAO indicated that these barriers could be overcome 
with proper training, new equipment, and adequate security clearances.93 
C. SUMMARY 
The literature on cybersecurity information-sharing indicates that there are 
significant barriers to cyber information-sharing and that organizations, both private and 
public, have obstacles to overcome to ensure successful sharing and prevention of future 
cyberattacks. These obstacles include trust, legal, and technological barriers. Other 
obstacles include problems with privacy and lack of incentives to share. This thesis will 
contribute to the existing research literature by providing a current account of the 
landscape of what are the barriers to cyber information-sharing between public and 
private entities. 
91 Ponemon Institute, Exchanging Cyber Threat Intelligence: There Has to Be a Better Way (Traverse 
City, MI: Ponemon Institute, 2014). 
92 “The President, EO 13526: Executive Order 13526: Classified National Security Information, 
Memorandum of December 29, 2009, Implementation of the Executive Order ‘Classified National Security 
Information’, Order of December 29, 2009, Original Classification Authority: United States,” The Federal 
Register, accessed September 9, 2014,  http://www.archives.gov/isoo/pdf/cnsi-eo.pdf . 
93Harold C. Relyea, “Homeland Security and Information Sharing: Federal Policy Considerations,” 
Government Information Quarterly 21, no. 4 (2004): 420–438. 
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Through the sharing of cybersecurity information, stakeholders are provided 
timely information on the most critical threats. They can use this important information to 
implement an effective solution that will reduce the risk to their mission-essential 
services and data.   
This thesis asks the questions, what are the primary barriers to cyber information-
sharing between government and private sector organizations?  And, how can these 
barriers may be overcome?  While some private and public sector organizations have 
begun to share cybersecurity information, there are still many barriers that are preventing 
the ability to share more.  
A qualitative method of analysis through review of literature sources was used to 
identify the barriers to cybersecurity information-sharing with an emphasis on issued of 
trust, law, policy, and technology. The data were researched, coded, and categorized into 
major themes related to the research question through the use of a software product 
designed for qualitative analysis called NVivo.   
B. LITERATURE SOURCES 
Literature sources, such as government documents, books, and websites were 
used to perform this study. The primary source books were focused on cyber security, 
collaboration, and information sharing. Google Scholar, Dudley Knox Library, and the 
Homeland Security Digital Library were used to search for books and other materials on 
the subject. Other sources included the websites for Department of Homeland Security, 
White House, and Congressional hearing sources. There were many journal and trusted 
news related websites that were used as well. The data collected to perform this study 
spanned several years and was gather from books, journals, websites, Congressional 
hearings and news organizations. Some notable works that were included were P.W. 
Singer and Allan Friedman’s Cybersecurity and Cyberwar What Everyone Needs to 
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Know and Paul Rosenzweig’s Cyber Warfare: How Conflicts in Cyberspace Are 
Challenging America and Changing the World.  
C. INSTRUMENT 
Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) called NVivo 
from QSR Corporation was used in data analysis for  this study. NVivo has been known 
to support data analysis because of the software’s ability to make the analysis transparent 
to other researchers, its ability to manage large amounts of data, and its associated search 
and retrieval features. There are many benefits from using a product like NVivo such as 
creation of auditable footprints, allowing the research to be more explicit and reflective 
on the process, providing increased transparency, and providing new opportunities for 
data analysis.94  
NVivo helps organize data for easy retrieval and analysis. It takes the place of the 
manual method of copying data, selecting sections of text, highlighting, and organizing 
into folders. NVivo software makes it possible to collect the data with common topics in 
nodes that contain pointers to various sections of several documents.95 
In addition to the NVivo software, the NVivo Toolkit was used to assist with the 
qualitative analysis. The NVivo Toolkit was developed by Maureen O’Neill, researcher 
at the University of the Sunshine Coast, Queensland, Australia. Through the use of the 
NVivo Toolkit, O’Neill asserts that it is possible to constantly interrogate the data, 
moving from lower order to higher order themes, and providing a higher degree study 
through four stages as shown in Figure 1.96  
While NVivo software helps with recording and analysis of the data, it is not 
designed to be a mechanism to automatically reach conclusions. Hence, it is still the 
researcher who uses the NVivo software to organize data, continuously looking for 
relationships with or contradictions to the data, shadowing the data in broad literature and 
94 Maureen O’Neill, “NVivo Toolkit,” QSR Corporation, accessed April 19, 2014, 
http://explore.qsrinternational.com/nvivo-toolkit.  
95 Bengt Edhlund, NVivo Essentials, Raleigh, NC: Lulu.com, 2007. 
96 Ibid. 
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research context, and formulating findings. The core of NVivo is that the researcher is the 
one who analyses data and not the software itself.97 
Key to the qualitative analysis process is diminishing any doubt surrounding the 
reliability and validity of qualitatively produced findings, and formulating a serious 
method of data analysis.98 Successful research using qualitative data relies on the rigor 
and thoroughness of the data analysis methods. The findings of this study are validated 
based on the vast data collection and qualitative analysis tool that was used for analyzing, 
coding, and presenting the theme of the data. By using a tool such as NVivo, themes were 
rendered automatically from the data of the sources. Through reflection of the themes and 
the data, it allowed for re-examination and confirmed certain aspects of this research.   
The NVivo Toolkit describes the process of using the software in four steps as 
explained in the next section. Each step must be completed before entering the next step. 
This model of qualitative research is similar to the process that was designed by Rudolph 
Sinkovics and Eva Alfoldi.99  
D. PROCEDURES  
Successful research using qualitative data relies on the rigor and thoroughness of 
the data analysis methods and how qualitative data can be rigorously analyzed. The 
following procedures were used in conducting this study: 
• Descriptive: Enter data sources in to NVivo 
• Topic: Organize and code data  
• Analytic: Analyze and query data  
• Conclusion: Draw answers from data  
The first step, descriptive, involves entering the project details into NVivo such as 
the project information, and sources. The sources identified in the “Literature Review” 
97 O’Neill, “NVivo Toolkit.” 
98 Matthew B. Miles and A. Michael Huberman, Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 1994). 
99 Rudolf R. Sinkovics and Eva A. Alfoldi, “Facilitating the Interaction between Theory and Data in 
Qualitative Research using CAQDAS,” in Qualitative Organizational Research: Core Methods and 
Current Challenges, eds. Gillian Symon and Catherine Cassell (London: SAGE, 2012), 21.  
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chapter include internal sources such as websites, pdf documents, and Microsoft Word 
documents from literature of on cybersecurity information-sharing. The external sources 
are the books and other items that were cited using the tool RefWorks. RefWorks data 
were imported into NVivo and notes were used to record thoughts and observations about 
the data. 
The details of the data sources collected were entered into the research project 
into NVivo sources, which contained the sub-sections of internals, memos and 
externals.100 Internals are primary research materials that are imported or created in 
NVivo that serve as the data sources as noted above. This includes any combination of 
documents, PDFs, audio, video, pictures or data sets. Memos allow for storing memos 
and other recordings about the study. Externals are proxies that represent research 
materials that cannot be imported in to NVivo, such as books or manuscripts.  
The second step in the process includes abstracting obvious topics from the 
sources to create nodes. A node is basically a subject, concept, process, or idea. In this 
thesis, the nodes equate to the thesis research. The nodes that emerged as a result of this 
research include trust, legal, policy, and technology as the main barriers to cyber 
information-sharing.  
The third step is to analyze the data in the sources and merge the nodes into sets 
or model the data into relationships by querying the data. This analytic step involved the 
initial merging of nodes and the running of queries. This helps narrow down the top 
barriers to cyber information-sharing. For example, the initial nodes for the legal node 
included many nodes such as privacy laws, antitrust laws, other cyber laws, and so on. 
After querying and researching more on the subject, the data emerged into a single node 
to be legal. Alan Bryman suggests that this is the process of exploring more complex 
aspects of the nodes.101 This will be described in more detail in the next section.   
100 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).   
The sources analyzed for this thesis included approximately 400 items, including available unclassified 
U.S. government reports and studies on cyber issues for the past decade as well as academic and other 
studies available through the NPS Dudley Knox Library and other locations. 
101 Ibid. 
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The last step is to reach a conclusion. Conclusions are more readily verified as the 
analysis continues, but certainly do not completely appear until the data collection is 
finalized.
102
 For this study, NVivo assisted in organizing the data so the analysis could 
draw conclusions that were reliable and unproblematic. Chapter V will cover the 
conclusions from this study. 
E. DATA ANALYSIS  
Thematic analysis was used to capture important categories in the data in relation 
to the research questions. It revealed patterns and made sense of the data in a meaningful 
way. The data served as evidence for the themes and relationships that were established. 
Through the use of NVivo’s automatic coding mechanisms, obvious topics were 
drawn from the sources and the data were coded. Coding in NVivo allows for the 
grouping of related concepts to be organized in containers, the aforementioned nodes. 
This process is facilitated by allocating coding stripes and highlighting certain phrases 
and sentences, which denotes obvious topics that had originated from the formulation of 
nodes. The following figure shows the nodes and coding stripes for this study that were 
automatically marked in this study by using the Auto Code feature of NVivo.  
102 Matthew B. Miles and A. Michael Huberman, The Qualitative Researcher’s Companion 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2002). 
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 Figure 2.  NVivo coding 
Coding is the key process of analysis through NVivo. As nodes are described as 
the places to store ideas, coding is the way to store pointers to the text about those ideas. 
Coding is the computerized equivalent of putting all the relevant material into a file 
folder per each node. Coding not only allows users to find relevant data to research 
questions quickly, but it also helps to obtain and refine clues from materials. The coding 
in Figure 2 shows the relevant coverage of the barriers to cyber information-sharing and 
the coding stripes are shown in color at the right side.   
The editing, coding, and analyzing process of NVivo could be endless because it 
can be used to continuously reorganize and refine research ideas. In brief, NVivo is used 
to help record and organize data, based on certain categories. NVivo’s functions are used 
to assist with the analysis by making links, coding, sorting and doing simple statistics, 
thus finding out relationships or no relationships. It is more equivalent with this study’s 
epistemology and methodology than free-mapping or pure quantitative studies.  
By using the NVivo software tool, this thesis can help provide input for future 
research. The relevant theories of this work concerning information-sharing can further 
add to data analysis and discussion. For example, another researcher could show cyber 
analyst’s influences toward sharing through the addition of standard operating procedures 
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and incident response data at a security operations center for further analysis. In this way, 
the relevant literature and analysis that was already performed can be utilized and 
reflected upon for continued research. 
NVivo software is used to identify themes and classify the literature data. This is 
a very similar to that described for empirical data analysis. The analytic stage, step 3 of 
the NVivo Toolkit process, involved the initial merging of nodes and the running of 
queries. Bryman suggests that this is the process of exploring more complex aspects of 
the nodes.103 
Earlier, the chapter touched on how the data are analyzed and refined through the 
use of queries. The example explained how the “legal” node emerged by running queries 
under the many different initial nodes for the different laws pertaining to cyber 
information-sharing such as privacy, intellectual property, liability, and antitrust law. By 
generating these queries, it was found to be much better to merge the nodes into the one 
node, legal. 
Other queries that were performed were to find the legal barriers and why they 
were barriers. For example, the antitrust laws were found to be a barrier because of the 
query of the sources for antitrust. By having all the sources available to query, it was 
much easier to find the evidence needed to identify that antitrust was a major theme 
under the legal barriers to sharing. According to Amitai Aviram and Avishalom Tor, the 
contemporary assessment of the competitive effects of information-sharing among 
competitors is a showcase of the duality of public policy and antitrust law toward 
cooperation.104 Scholars recognize the potential anti-competitive effects of information-
sharing among competitors, but at the same time acknowledge the social benefits derived 
from this business practice.105  
Through NVivo’s coding process, queries, merging and continued analysis, the 
nodes that emerged to the top of the analysis were trust, technology, policy, and legal. 
103 Bryman, Social Research Methods. 
104 Avishalom Tor and Amitai Aviram, “Overcoming Impediments to Information Sharing.” Alabama 
Law Review 55, no. 2 (Winter 2004): 231–279. 
105 Tor and Aviram, “Overcoming Impediments to Information Sharing.” 
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Therefore, the thematic analysis of the sources validated the fact that those are the main 
barriers to cyber information-sharing and will be the findings discussed in future 
chapters.   
NVivo has multiple visualization options, including modeling, to display 
qualitative analysis data. The models, are used to show the relationships between the 
various items and to demonstrate the theory, or how the data supports the hypothesis. 
Tables can be used to find out the existence or non-existence of similarities, differences 
and relationships. The model in Figure 3 shows the barriers to cyber information-sharing 
from the thematic analysis of the external data sources. 
 
Figure 3.  NVivo mapping model  
It has been suggested that the qualitative researcher has few guidelines for reliable 
and thorough findings.106 However, by using tools such as NVivo, a user is able to use 
techniques that ensure thoroughness and reliability in the analysis of the data with a 
higher degree of study and validation. 
Conclusions are more readily verified as the analysis continues, but they do not 
completely appear until the data collection is finalized. For this study, NVivo assisted in 
organizing the data so the analysis could draw conclusions that were reliable and free 
from problems.  
106 Miles and Huberman, Qualitative Data Analysis.  
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After completing the procedures in the four steps of the process, the author was 
able to translate from the NVivo project to consider the meaning of higher order themes 
for the discussion chapter. By using NVivo in support of this analysis, the major themes 
that emerged of the barriers to cybersecurity information-sharing include trust, legal, 
policy, and technology barriers. The conclusions were made by performing each of the 
four steps and enabled the development of the findings and recommendations of this 
thesis.   
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IV. RESULTS 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This study asks the questions, what are the primary barriers to cyber information-
sharing between government and private sector organizations?  And, how can these 
barriers can be overcome? While some private and public sector organizations have 
begun to share cybersecurity information, there are still many barriers that are preventing 
the ability to share more. As explained previously, more than 300 sources of information 
were gathered and researched (see Appendix A). Through the research of the literature 
and the use of NVivo to help organize and query the data, it is evident that the barriers to 
sharing cyber information are primarily trust, legal, policy, and technology. These major 
themes that emerged from the data provide a vivid observation of the barriers to cyber 
information-sharing. Figure 4 displays the results of the analysis and shows the total 
items that were coded and the number of coding references for each theme.   
 
 














The basic element of trust was identified as a major theme. There has been a lot of 
research and development in the field of computational trust in the past decade. Much of 
it has acknowledged or claimed that trust is a good thing.107 Trust is an important factor 
when developing sharing partnerships and is found to be one of the major barriers to 
sharing cybersecurity information. 
Trust is identified as one of the strategic keystones of the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence (ODNI), Intelligence Community, Information Sharing Strategy.108 
According to the ODNI, the “need-to-know” culture led to practices that inhibit 
information-sharing today. Multiple organizations establish their own classification rules 
and procedures, resulting in inconsistent use and understanding of security markings. 
Differing requirements for access and certification and accreditation inhibit trust across 
the intelligence community. The key concepts are the need for consistent certification and 
accreditation practices, uniform information security standards, and uniformity across the 
intelligence community for accessing data to enable information-sharing.109  
Additional evidence of the importance of trust is suggested by a study conducted 
by MITRE Corporation.110 The study revealed a high degree of trust is required to share 
cybersecurity information and that is a barrier. In the study, MITRE found that it may be 
difficult to share cybersecurity-related information between a for-profit company and its 
competitors or among government agencies due to conflict-of-interest issues. The study 
also suggests that members may be reluctant to share information with another company 
that is trying to maximize profits while acting as a trusted third party.  
In another study performed by the European Network and Information Security 
Agency (ENISA), it was noted that formal means for sharing information should be set 
107 Stephen Marsh and Mark R. Dibben, “Trust, Untrust, Distrust and Mistrust–an Exploration of the 
Dark (Er) Side,” in Trust Management, 17–33 (New York: Springer, 2005). 
108 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, United States Intelligence Community Information 
Sharing Strategy (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Feb. 22, 2008). 
109 Ibid. 
110 “Cyber Information-Sharing Models: An Overview,” Mitre, accessed February 12, 2014, 
http://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/cyber_info_sharing.pdf. 
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up in order to improve the protection and rapid restoration of infrastructure critical to the 
reliability of communications within and throughout Europe.111 The study finds that 
companies may be reluctant to share information directly with a government agency, due 
to fears of information being leaked or disclosed by Freedom of Information Act 
requests. In addition, there are cultural barriers that often lead companies to distrust the 
government. Companies need to feel that the benefits they gain by sharing sensitive 
information with the government must outweigh the risks; often, this barrier is not 
crossed.112 
Other evidence that trust is a key factor for information-sharing is from a 
conference that was held in Boston, Massachusetts, at the Advanced Cyber Security 
Center (ACSC) in November 2013. The conference reviewed some of the barriers to 
cyber information-sharing and trust was a major topic. At the conference, Phyllis 
Schneck, deputy under secretary for cyber security for the National Protection and 
Programs Directorate of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, stated that her 
number one priority is building trust between the government and the private sector. She 
also said that the cybersecurity community has the ability to defeat this adversary, by 
building trust. Furthermore, global situational awareness is the dream, and DHS plans to 
engaging people within the community to get their trust and by incentivizing 
companies.113 
With the recent NSA leaks and the WikiLeaks problems there are even more trust 
barriers to cyber information-sharing between public and private entities.114 In a recent 
FedScoop article, Dan Verton discusses the ongoing problem with the NSA Edward 
Snowden leaks and the problems faced with sharing cyber information with public and 
private sector because of the lack of trust based on leaked information.115 According to 
the article, Larry Castro of the NSA said that the Snowden’s unauthorized disclosures 
111 Robinson and Disley, Incentives and Challenges for Information Sharing.  
112 Ibid. 
113 Blevins, “Experts Propose Better Cybersecurity Information-Sharing Models.” 
114 Ibid. 
115 Dan Verton, “NSA Leaks Threaten Global Cybersecurity Information Sharing,” FedScoop, 
October 16, 2013, http://fedscoop.com/nsa-leaks-threaten-global-cybersecurity-information-sharing/. 
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took the wind out of the sails of what was a growing agreement that the NSA had a very 
direct role to play in supporting the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and 
providing actionable cyber-threat information.  
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) was created based on 
the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission because of the failed intelligence sharing 
that could have prevented the attacks of that day.116 After the WikiLeaks scandal, 
intelligence officials defended information-sharing practices, and claimed that it was 
possible to reconcile these practices with strong security.117 They are likely about to 
come under renewed political pressure, as a result of Sunday’s revelations. According to 
the Washington Post, after the leaked information, the ODNI and the Intelligence 
Community now have stricter rules for information.118 Now that the leaked NSA 
information is in the open source, there are many implications that will plague us for this 
for years to come. Some experts agree that the leaks will make the United States require 
more transparency of federal programs.119 
According to Col. Cedric Leighton, the former NSA deputy director of training at 
the Bloomberg Enterprise Technology Summit in New York City, , Snowden’s leaks had 
performed a significant disservice to the worldwide health of the Internet.120 Leighton 
was talking about the recent moves by Brazil and other countries to reconsider the 
decentralized nature of the foundation of the Internet. 
Trust is a major theme in any type of information-sharing, not just cybersecurity. 
David Sutton, an expert in cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection explains 
that whatever their focus, partnerships require that a fundamental level of trust be 
116 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 911 Commission Report, 
567. 
117 Information Sharing in the Era of WikiLeaks: Balancing Security and Collaboration: Hearing 
Before the Committee On Homeland Security and Governmental Affair, 112th Cong (2011). 




120 Zack Whittaker, “Former NSA Executive: Snowden Leaks Caused ‘Significant Disservice’ to the 
Internet,” ZDNet, April 24, 2014, http://www.zdnet.com/former-nsa-deputy-director-snowden-leaks-
caused-significant-disservice-to-the-Internet-7000028746/. 
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established between the partners in order to have any chance of success.121 In parallel 
with trust, there is also a need to share information between partners, which must be 
carried out in a controlled and secure manner.122 According to Sutton, the issue of trust is 
the fundamental to the formation of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). Furthermore, if 
trust cannot be established or if it breaks down for any reason, the extent to which 
information may be shared and the resulting effectiveness of a PPP will be significantly 
reduced.123 
Issues related to trust need to be understood and addressed before an organization 
launches a new sharing initiative.124 As this analysis shows, trust is the basic theme that 
is needed in order to be able to begin to share information. The next chapter will examine 
ways to overcome the trust issues such as using a trust relationship model approach to 
sharing as well as information-sharing agreements to legally bind the trust relationship. 
2. Legal  
Another theme that arose in the analysis as a main barrier to cyber information-
sharing are legal issues. The findings revealed that the legal barriers to cybersecurity 
information-sharing are privacy, antitrust and liability issues, and protection of 
confidential information. According to the Heritage Foundation, the first element of any 
legislation must be to enable and foster information-sharing between the public and 
private sectors, and among private-sector.125 Furthermore, any legislation must provide 
robust protection for privacy and individual freedoms.  
The 112th Congress tried to pass comprehensive cybersecurity legislation. The 
Cyber Intelligence and Sharing Protection Act (CISPA), passed the House of 
121Sutton, “The Issue of Trust and Information Sharing,” 258–276.  
122 Ibid.   
123 Ibid. 
124 G. Scott Erickson and Helen N. Rothberg, “Knowledge Assets, E-Networks and Trust,” in Jean-
Marc Seigneur  and Adam Slagell, eds., Collaborative Computer Security and Trust Management 
(Hershey, PA: Information Science Reference/IGI Global, 2010), 1. 
125Steven Bucci, Paul Rosenzweig and David Inserra, A Congressional Guide: Seven Steps to U.S. 
Security , Prosperity, and Freedom in Cyberspace (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2013).  
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Representatives, but no law was produced.126 Also introduced was the Cybersecurity Act 
(CSA) of 2012, also known as the Lieberman–Collins bill. According to The Heritage 
Foundation, the CSA failed to pass because of differences among members of Congress 
regarding how the nation should approach the growing challenge of cybersecurity.127 The 
key revision to the CSA made cybersecurity standards voluntary, but some agencies’ 
regulations would have made them mandatory in specific sectors. Many stakeholders 
think that regulation is not the way to go for fostering sharing cybersecurity information; 
therefore, the CSA did not become law.128  
The Cyberspace Policy Review explains that private organizations are concerned 
that certain federal laws might prevent full collaborative partnerships and operational 
information-sharing between the private sector and government.129 An example of this 
cited in the review is collusion where information-sharing and collective planning occurs 
among members of the same sector under existing partnership. Another example is the 
reluctance to share because the company does not want to disclose sensitive or 
proprietary business information to federal government, such as vulnerabilities and data 
or network breaches. 
Although there are laws to protect companies from this, such as the Trade Secrets 
Act and the Critical Infrastructure Information Act, which addresses concerns with 
respect to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), there is still much reluctance to 
share.130 In addition, companies are also concerned about harm to their reputation, 
liability, or regulatory consequences in regards to sharing. This works both ways too, in 
that the federal government will limit the information it will share with the private 
126 Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, 2013. HR 624 (2013). 
127 Bucci, Rosenzweig and Inserra, A Congressional Guide.  
128 James L. Gattuso, Ensuring Cybersecurity: More Red Tape is Not the Answer (Washington, DC: 
The Heritage Foundation, June 5, 2012), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/06/cybersecurity-
and-red-tape-more-regulations-not-the-answer.  
129 The White House, Cyberspace Policy Review.  
130 Uniform Trade Secrets Act with 1985 Amendments; Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 
2002, Pub. L 107–296 (2002); Freedom of Information Act, (1967). 
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companies because of the need to protect sources and methods or the privacy rights of 
individuals. 
Antitrust laws provide important safeguards against unfair competition, and FOIA 
helps ensure transparency in government that is essential to maintain public confidence. 
The civil liberties and privacy community has expressed concern that extending 
protections would only serve as a legal shield against liability.131 In addition, the 
challenges of information-sharing can be further complicated by the global nature of the 
information and communications marketplace. When members of industry operating in 
the United States are foreign-owned, mandatory information-sharing, or exclusion of 
such companies from information-sharing regimes, can present trade implications.132 
Sharing between the private sector and the government is challenging because of 
the legal protections that private sector needs in order to share their information. One 
problem is that private sector companies worry that information they share may be used 
against them by the government. In a report by the Congressional Research Service 
(CRS), policymakers argued that there is a need for the federal government and owners 
and operators of the nation’s critical infrastructures to share information on 
vulnerabilities and threats and to promote information-sharing between the private and 
public sectors in order to protect critical assets from cybersecurity threats.133 Private 
sector entities may wish to share information with one another about threats they have 
faced or are currently facing. They may also wish to collaborate on solutions to these 
issues. Additionally, the government may have information about cybersecurity threats 
that would be similarly useful to potential targets in the private sector. The government 
may see value in having access to information from the private sector about cybersecurity 
threats. The CRS report explains that obstacles to information-sharing may exist in 
current antitrust laws. Private entities that share information may be concerned that 
sharing cyber threat information may lead to increased civil liability, or that shared 
131 The White House, Cyberspace Policy Review. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Edward C. Liu et al., Cybersecurity: Selected Legal Issues (CRS Report No. R42409) 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012).  
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information may contain proprietary or confidential business information that may be 
used by competitors.   
The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative #5 (CNCI-5) information-
sharing architecture (ISA) provides the architecture guidance that the federal cyber 
centers use to enable cyber information-sharing. The ISA provides a risk chart and there 
are several a high risk items. One high risk item is that authorities and legal restrictions 
(or lack of clear guidance) may prevent sharing. The CNCI-5 program management team 
is working to resolve these risks through policy working groups that include legal 
representation from the centers.   
In another report developed by analysts at U.S. STRATCOM, legal issues that 
specifically deal with cybersecurity and information-sharing are identified as the USA-
PATRIOT Act (Patriot Act) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Intellectual Property Antitrust Law Title 10 & Title 50 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA).134 
This report provides a comprehensive overview of the laws pertaining to cybersecurity 
and collaboration between public and private organizations such as the USA-PATRIOT 
Act (Patriot Act), and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The legal 
recommendations include proposed amendments to laws cited as perceived or actual 
barriers to collaboration, which include the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Antitrust Law, and the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act (FACA).135 
These same legal concerns were addressed in a report that was published over 
fourteen years ago by the U.S. Air Force Institute for National Security Studies. The 
USAF report also cited two additional legal issues, concerns about the release of national 
134 Frederick Bartell et al., Collaborating with the Private Sector (Fort Belvoir: Defense Technical 
Information Center, August 2009). 
135 Ibid. 
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security material and barriers with the cooperation with law enforcement agencies which 
are still concerns today.136 
3. Policy 
Another barrier to cybersecurity information-sharing and a theme that evolved 
from the analysis is policy issues. The policy issues can be categorized into three areas 
and consist of policies related to legal issues to include liability and privacy, inter-
organizational agreements for sharing and connection, and other policy issues including 
organizational and federal policies for sharing cybersecurity information. According to 
the Heritage Foundation, Congress should pursue a cybersecurity policy that avoids a 
cumbersome and expensive regulatory approach and enables information-sharing instead 
of regulating it.137  
a. Liability and Privacy Policy Concerns 
According to a report by CSIS, organizations follow the guidance derived from 
the Executive Order 12333 that implements the Privacy Act of 1974 or the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).138  These documents ensure that privacy rights of 
U.S. persons are protected. The problem with these policies is that they were not 
developed with the idea that we had to defend networks from malicious activity.  
Members of Congress have been engaged in cyber legislative discussions within 
the past few years. Although they generally agree that comprehensive cyber reforms are 
necessary to protect both private and government information systems, there are serious 
disagreements over the details of the development and implementation of policy.139 For 
example, congressional staff has been debating about the role of the federal government 
136 Steven M. Rinaldi, Sharing the Knowledge: Government-Private Sector Partnerships to Enhance 
Information Security (Colorado Springs, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2000).  
137 Bucci, Rosenzweig and Inserra, A Congressional Guide. 
138 Adriane Lapointe, Oversight for Cybersecurity Activities: Why Intelligence Policies Won’t Work, 
and What Kind of Approach Will (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, n.d.) 
http://csis.org/files/publication/101202_Oversight_for_Cybersecurity_Activities.pdf.  
139 Bucci, Rosenzweig and Inserra, A Congressional Guide.  
 43 
                                                 
and the responsibility and capabilities of DHS.140 In addition, they also have been 
debating about the role of the private sector and how information-sharing between private 
sector and government would be done. There are also debates over what standards should 
be used for protecting critical infrastructure as well as how to best develop the future of 
our cyber-security workforce.  
These debates are hampered by the limitations of Executive Orders. Under current 
law, including the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and antitrust laws, the 
companies that wish to share information with the government in order to help thwart 
cyberattacks may face civil and possibly criminal penalties.141 These liabilities prevent 
the private sector from sharing with the federal government. The Cybersecurity 
Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA) introduced in both the 112th and 
113th congressional sessions attempted to address these liabilities but failed to be 
approved.142 The findings conclude that the government needs more policies in place to 
protect information systems and infrastructure. Since the Edward Snowden leaks the 
public has concerns about their private information possibly being used by the 
government.143 Since private industry has a responsibility to both its consumers and the 
government, a further debate needs to happen in order to balance the issue of sharing 
between private sector and government. 
According to the NIST, a key challenge for privacy has been the difficulty in 
reaching consensus on definition and scope management, given its nature of being 
context-dependent and relatively subjective.144 The Fair Information Practice Principles 
(FIPPs)—developed in the early stages of computerization and data aggregation to 
address the handling of individuals’ personal information has become foundational in the 
140 Ibid. 
141 Rinaldi, Sharing the Knowledge. 
142 Pauline C. Reich, “Culture Clashes: Freedom, Privacy, and Government Surveillance Issues 
Arising in Relation to National Security and Internet Use,” in Law, Policy, and Technology (Hershey PA: 
IGI Global, 2012), 200–278. 
143 Whittaker, “Former NSA Executive.”  
144 “NIST Roadmap for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,” National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST), February 12 2014, 
http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/upload/roadmap-021214.pdf.  
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current conception of privacy. They have been used as a basis for a number of laws and 
regulations, as well as various sets of privacy principles and frameworks around the 
world.145 The FIPPs, however, are a process-oriented set of principles for handling 
personal information. They do not purport to define privacy in a way that has enabled the 
development of a risk management model nor do they provide specific technical 
standards or best practices that can guide organizations in implementing consistent 
processes to avoid violating the privacy of individuals. 
Furthermore, the lack of risk management model, standards, and supporting 
privacy metrics, makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness of an organization’s privacy 
protection methods. Policies are often designed to address business risks that arise out of 
privacy violations, such as reputation or liability risks, rather than focusing on 
minimizing the risk of harm at an individual or societal level. According to NIST, there 
are few identifiable technical standards or best practices to mitigate the impact of 
cybersecurity activities on individuals’ privacy or civil liberties.146 
b. Sharing and Interconnection Agreements 
There is a lack of clearly defined steps that industry can take when partnering in 
government cybersecurity activities. Some recommendations identified in the literature 
were from Mitre and the Enduring Security Framework Operations Group. The 
recommendation was that the government should initiate government-industry 
agreements that enable industry to share information that is protected and aligned with 
other information that is provided by the industry.147 This information can be used in a 
non-attributed type of product that can then be shared with other participants. The 
agreement needs to clearly define when and to what extent information is shared. 
In addition, the agreement should include specific clauses that are common to all 
industry participants and that may be tailored to specific aspects of the sharing 
145 “NIST Cybersecurity Framework,” NIST, accessed June 2, 2014, 
http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/upload/cybersecurity-framework-021214.pdf. 
146 Ibid.  
147 Fernandez Vazquez et al., “Conceptual Framework for Cyber Defense Information Sharing within 
Trust Relationships.” 
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transactions.148 For example, the clauses may include specific information about an 
individual company’s particular involvement, where the entire agreement outlines all 
expectations and limitations on overall industry involvement in the initiative. 
Furthermore, as new companies are incorporated into the sharing initiative, modifications 
for their particular agreement should be identified and included as best practices for other 
agreements that are under development.149 
c. Federal Cyber Sharing Policies 
According to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) antitrust guidelines, sector 
specific agencies should coordinate with the Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust 
Division in the development of a critical infrastructure protection business review 
training module that will outline the process available to industry for collaborations with 
critical infrastructure protection partners.150 In addition, the sector specific agencies in 
conjunction with the DOJ should provide training on the aspects of antitrust specifically 
related to cybersecurity efforts and antitrust compliance so that government and industry 
remain educated on and sensitive to methods that can mitigate this concern and ensure 
antitrust compliance.151  
4. Technology 
Technology issues, specifically the automation of cyber information-sharing, were 
also identified in the analysis as a barrier to cyber information-sharing. The cybersecurity 
information needed to be shared includes cyber threat indicators, malware findings, 
incidents, and victim information. Currently, these types of data are shared in the way of 
reports via email, websites, and data feeds. The reports are shared as word documents, 
PDF files, or even XML feeds via email or links from websites. There is very little in the 
148 Enduring Security Framework Operations Group, Threat and Vulnerability Information Sharing 
Working Panel Final Report (unpublished manuscript, January 2010). 
149 Ibid. 
150 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Antitrust Guidelines 





                                                 
way of automated information-sharing. The automated sharing of cyber information is the 
main push for organizations and is identified as one of the main barriers. 
Differences in technological capabilities of government agencies and in the 
private sector such as the availability of information-sharing capabilities and skilled 
employees to develop these systems present an important challenge in cyber information-
sharing. Furthermore, the lack of standardized systems and data structures limit the 
success of information-sharing initiatives. The technologies needed to enable a successful 
cyber information-sharing capability should include middleware services such as web 
services and data transformation services, web portals, content management and content 
discovery, identity control and access management (ICAM) and data tagging, structured 
languages to share common data, and cross domain solutions to enable sharing across 
multiple security domains. The next chapter will provide a discussion of the technology 
recommendations for a successful information-sharing architecture. 
B. VALIDITY OF FINDINGS 
The validity of these results is addressed by constantly reviewing the findings and 
querying the data with multiple query terms. Any relevant new data that emerged from 
this step was integrated into the findings for further analysis. In addition, NVivo software 
was used to assist with organization of content, coding, and theme identification by 
providing the automated capability to narrow down the results of the thesis and therefore 
identifying the findings. According to Creswell, the advantages of using a computer 
program to assist with data analysis is that it provides a way to organize and file data for 
quick access; it forces the investigator to look closely at the data and think about what 
each sentence might mean; it provides a mapping feature which allows visibility into the 
relationships among the data; finally, it allows easy retrieval of the data.152 
152 John W. Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing among Five Approaches 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2012). 
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This thesis identified some of the primary barriers to cyber information-sharing 
between government and the private sector and how these barriers may be overcome. 
Through the study, it has been determined that if organizations implemented better 
practices of sharing cyber threat information, they could use this information to protect 
their networks and ultimately our infrastructure would be more secure.   
After analyzing the data from the sources of this study, it is evident that the 
barriers to sharing of cybersecurity information are not much different than barriers when 
sharing other types of information such as law enforcement or intelligence information. 
The major factors that contribute to cyber information-sharing barriers were found to be 
trust, legal, policy, and technology. The next section will identify the factors to enable 
more successful sharing of cyber information such as incentives, trust relationships, and 
sharing agreements, better standards, and the NIST cyber framework, 
According to Paul Rosenzweig and David Inserra of The Heritage Foundation, 
sharing cybersecurity intelligence information between the private and public sectors is 
important because it alerts companies and agencies to likely attacks or specific problems 
in the software.153 In order for information-sharing efforts to be effective, the 
government should organize sharing efforts in order for this information to flow more 
rapidly, preferably in an automated fashion. When sharing cyber intelligence information, 
the private sector needs to be provided with legal, FOIA, and regulatory protections so 
they are not punished when they do share. Information sharing should be broad enough to 
ensure that government agencies have the actionable intelligence they need in order to 
prevent cybercrime and attacks. Finally, information-sharing must have robust, but not 
restrictive, oversight to ensure that information is used appropriately. 
153 David Inserra and Paul Rosenzweig, Cybersecurity Information Sharing: One Step Toward U.S. 
Security, Prosperity, and Freedom in Cyberspace (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, April 1, 2014). 
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B. OVERCOMING TRUST BARRIERS 
According to Sutton, trust is something that develops over time.154 The 
beginnings of a trusted relationship cannot easily be developed over long distances. It is 
through personal contact between private and public sector representatives over time 
when trust begins to develop. Furthermore, by sharing useful information between part-
ners, trust is increased, and although a major incident is not a thing to be wished for, 
when one happens and the relationship works well together, the level of trust increases 
even further. 
Another way in which trust may be developed is through regular emergency 
exercises. These can be based on scenarios likely to affect public and private sector alike, 
and can also act as a catalyst to find innovative ways of working together in a crisis.  
In a recent survey done by the Ponemon Institute, the question was asked about 
what is the best way to exchange threat intelligence.155 Many of the respondents 
suggested that a trusted intermediary that shares with other organizations was the best 
way to share. Another group of respondents suggested the use of a threat intelligence 
exchange service would be a good way to share cyber threat intelligence.   
In an ENISA study of successful public private partnerships, one recommendation 
is about the importance of Trust Building Policies. The ENISA study reports that in 
information-sharing networks where information-sharing is the core service provided, a 
key requirement is a high degree of trust in the network itself (i.e., that the policies, 
membership rules, requirement for security clearance, and interaction type must have 
been carefully designed to support trust.156 
Trust between entities need not be whole or persistent. Transient trust during a 
moment of crisis may allow for a piece of information to be shared between two entities 
that would have not otherwise been made available for consumption. A sliding trust scale 
154 Sutton, “The Issue of Trust and Information Sharing,” 258–276.  
155 Ponemon Institute, Exchanging Cyber Threat Intelligence. 




                                                 
is influenced by operational need and quality of relationship. It must be incorporated into 
a sharing network for information-sharing relationships that change over time. In this 
case, the partner you don’t trust today may be your best friend tomorrow. 
Trust relationships must span the different engagement levels: from the 
organizational leadership that empower their staff to produce and consume information to 
the technical staff that ultimately will use the information. Having an institutional process 
for guiding these types of relationships is central to the success of an organization as a 
whole in participating in information-sharing networks. To support these processes, 
organizations will need to focus on the trust scale while leveraging mechanisms and tools 
to support the mapping and perception of these relationships. 
Trust relationships are affected by both the organizational and ethnic cultures of 
the sharing entities. There are cultures where no information-sharing will take place until 
a maturity point is reached in the relationship. Then there are ethnic cultures where a 
business need will drive information-sharing even though the relationship has not 
matured enough for sustained information-sharing between entities. 
According to the Information Sharing Strategy of the Intelligence Community, 
confidence in the information and confidence in the people who has access to the 
information are all essential elements trust. The role of information quality of an 
information-sharing exchange can help build trust and mitigate risk.157 One way to do 
this is to include a system that integrates attribute-based access, automated user 
authorization and auditing, and security at the data-level to enable a trust-based model for 
the free-flow of information among participants.158 
The findings of the Ponemon study concluded that trusted intermediaries involved 
in the sharing of threat intelligence would improve current approaches to sharing threat 
intelligence. The best two ways to exchange threat intelligence are with a trusted 
157 Andreas I. Nicolaou and D. Harrison McKnight, “Perceived Information Quality in Data 
Exchanges: Effects on Risk, Trust, and Intention to Use,” Information Systems Research 17, no. 4 (2006): 
332–351.  
158 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, United States Intelligence Community Information 
Sharing Strategy.  
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intermediary that shares with other organizations and with a threat intelligence exchange 
service. They found that it is not as popular to share directly with other organizations or 
with a government entity that share with other organizations. 
C. THE LEGAL DEBATE 
The findings revealed that the legal barriers to cybersecurity information-sharing 
are privacy, antitrust, liability, and protection of confidential information. The following 
discussion points focus around these findings. 
1. Privacy 
Cybersecurity information shared for collaborative purposes might be used by 
competitors for commercial purposes, including such cases when government is a 
customer of either the initial company or a competitor. Government should initiate 
government-industry agreements that enable industry to share information that is 
protected and aligned with other industry-provided information. This will be fused in a 
non-attributed product to be shared with other participants. The agreement incorporates 
specific clauses defining the protection of commercial opportunities.   
In a research paper, Rachel Nyswander Thomas of the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies proposed legislation that would center public- and private-sector 
cybersecurity collaboration onto a single objective such as research and development.159 
She proposes “civic switchboards,” a mechanism for connecting resources among 
organizations that requires little government control. Thomas says two civic switchboards 
would be necessary to improve national cybersecurity-—a government-controlled one for 
information-sharing and incident response, and a nonprofit one for other objectives, such 
as research and development, technical standard setting and building human capital. In 
some cases, the government civic switchboard would act as an intermediary between 
existing public-private partnerships and in others foster the creation of new ones, she 
says. Thomas cites the Obama administration’s Startup American Partnership as an 
159 Rachel Nyswander Thomas, Securing Cyberspace through Public-Private Partnership A 
Comparative Analysis of Partnership Models (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, May 2012).  
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example of a civic switchboard-like entity; the partnership is a nonprofit convened at the 
behest of the Small Business Administration that seeks to promote entrepreneurship. 
2. Antitrust 
In a discussion paper by Avishalom Tor and Amitai Aviram titled “Overcoming 
Impediments to Information Sharing,” an assessment of the competitive effects of 
information-sharing among competitors is provided along with an outcome for a 
framework for public policy and antitrust law towards cooperation.160 Tor and Aviram 
claim that the behavioral approach to antitrust law draws on a large body of empirical 
behavioral evidence to inform antitrust doctrine and policymaking. In particular, 
behavioral antitrust focuses on findings that reveal how the judgment and decision 
behaviors of actual antitrust actors are likely to systematically and predictably deviate 
from the strict rationality that antitrust law currently assumes. Perhaps due to the 
dominance in antitrust of rationality-based law and economics—from the field’s 
jurisprudence and enforcement policies to its legal and economic scholarship—
behavioral findings took far longer to garner broad attention in antitrust law than in many 
other legal fields. In fact, until a few years ago, antitrust discourse largely neglected those 
behaviorally informed analyses offered by a small number of legal scholars. 
One way to overcome the legal barriers is through education and clarity about the 
laws that are currently barriers such as anti-trust. In a recent document by the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), some private entities may be 
hesitant to share cyber threat information with each other because they have been told by 
their legal counsel that sharing of information among competitors may raise antitrust 
concerns.161 FTC and DOJ do not believe that antitrust is a real barrier to cybersecurity 
information-sharing. According to the statement, while it is true that certain information-
sharing agreements among competitors can raise competitive concerns, the sharing of the 
160 Tor and Aviram, “Overcoming Impediments to Information Sharing,” 231–279. 
161 “FTC, DOJ Issue Antitrust Policy Statement on Sharing Cybersecurity Information,” Federal 
Trade Commission, accessed May 18, 2014, http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/04/ftc-
doj-issue-antitrust-policy-statement-sharing-cybersecurity.   
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cyber threat information is highly unlikely to lead to a reduction in competition and, 
consequently, would not be likely to raise antitrust concerns.162  
According to the FTC and the DOJ, antitrust guidelines, business review letters, and 
advisory opinions explain the analytical framework for information-sharing and the 
competition issues that may arise with information exchanges generally.163 The primary 
concern is that the sharing of competitively sensitive information—such as recent, current, 
and future prices, cost data, or output levels—may facilitate price or other competitive 
coordination among competitors. The joint DOJ/FTC Antitrust Guidelines for 
Collaborations among Competitors provide a good overview of how the Agencies 
analyze information-sharing as a general matter.164 
According to the guidelines, Sector Specific Agencies should coordinate with the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division and should provide annual training on 
aspects of antitrust specifically related to cybersecurity efforts and antitrust compliance 
so that government and industry may remain educated on and sensitive to methods that 
can mitigate this concern and ensure antitrust compliance.165 
According to the White House, the announcement by the Department of Justice 
and the Federal Trade Commission that clarifies that cybersecurity information can be 
shared with competitors without violating antitrust law—long a perceived barrier to 
effective cybersecurity is important. These enforcing our antitrust laws, have made clear 
today that they do not believe “that antitrust is—or should b—a roadblock to legitimate 
cybersecurity information-sharing.”166 
3. Liability and Protection of Confidential Information 
Private industry has reservations about sharing confidential or proprietary 
information with government about vulnerabilities or attacks because they worry that the 
162 Ibid. 
163 FTC and the DOJ, Antitrust Guidelines.  
164 Ibid  
165 Ibid. 
166 Daniel, “Getting Serious about Information Sharing for Cybersecurity.” 
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information could be released to the public under the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA). FOIA permits the public, including industry, and the media, to request and 
receive information that has been shared within and to the government. Under current law 
that information would also be available through FOIA requests to foreign citizens and 
foreign governments. Industry has requested that an exemption to FOIA be provided for 
the sharing of “sensitive corporate security” information with government.167 This is not 
a unique request and Congress has provided exemption in at least 60 different instances 
to prevent public disclosure of sensitive information.168 
Providing trust and instilling confidence that the information shared will be 
protected is a significant and necessary step to ensuring that a two-way flow of 
information can occur resulting in improved infrastructure protection. Most organizations 
have existing processes in place to ensure the protection of privacy and civil liberties 
when it comes to sharing information outside of their organizations.  
D. POLICY IMPLEMENTATIONS  
1. Overcoming Liability Concerns 
Future policies need to enable cyber information-sharing by removing 
ambiguities, providing strong protections to sharers, and establishing a public-private 
partnership to facilitate sharing. Entities that share cybersecurity information need certain 
protections.169 These protections include exempting all shared information from FOIA 
requests and regulatory use, and providing information sharers with strong liability 
protection.  
2. Information Sharing Agreements 
Effective information-sharing requires the government to share fully and in a 
timely manner with the private sector through a public-private partnership established for 
this purpose. An Information Sharing Agreement (ISA) is an agreement made between 
167 Freedom of Information Act, (1967). 
168 Rak, Information Sharing in the Cyber Age, 50 
169 Bucci, Rosenzweig and Inserra, A Congressional Guide. 
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two or more collaborating organizations which describe verification and compliance 
methodologies, and define the type of information and scope of sharing, how the 
information will be used, what access control policies are being used, what legal or policy 
frameworks exist for compliance of the information such as retention.170 
3. Federal Sharing Policies 
Executive Order 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, which 
was signed by President Obama in February 2013, has the most comprehensive policy for 
sharing cybersecurity information between private sector and government. It directs 
Federal agencies to use their existing authorities and increase cooperation with the private 
sector to provide better protection for the systems that are critical to our national and 
economic security.171 
In addition, President Obama signed the Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-21, 
Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience. While the EO establishes a number of 
specific programs to improve cybersecurity, it does so under the overall policy 
framework set out by PPD-21, which explains the President’s commitment to partner 
with owners and operators to secure our Nation’s critical infrastructure against threats.   
According to DHS, the EO, and PPD updates policy from a primary focus on 
protecting critical infrastructure against terrorism to protecting, securing, and making the 
nation’s critical infrastructure more resilient to all hazards, including natural disasters, 
manmade threats, pandemics, and cyberattacks.172 Furthermore, it directs the executive 
branch to strengthen our capability to understand and efficiently share information about 
how well critical infrastructure systems are functioning and the consequences of potential 
failures. 
170 “Multinational Experiment 7 Outcome 3—Cyber Domain Objective 3.2 Information Sharing 
Framework 22 January 2013,” NATO, accessed September 15, 2014, 
http://csrc.nist.gov/cyberframework/rfi_comments/dod_js_j7_part_2_022713.pdf.  
171 “The President, EO 13526: Executive Order 13526.“ 
172 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Executive Order 13636: Improving Critical 
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Under Executive Order 13636, NIST has produced the first version of a voluntary 
framework for reducing cybersecurity risk to critical infrastructure, which includes a 
methodology for protecting individuals’ privacy and civil liberties during the conduct of 
cybersecurity activities. Released in February 2014, the Framework for Improving 
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity was developed by collaborating extensively with 
critical infrastructure owners and operators, industry leaders, government partners, and 
other stakeholders. The accompanying NIST Roadmap for Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Cybersecurity identified the need for more privacy technical standards to 
support the privacy methodology.   
The Roadmap identifies key areas of development, alignment, and 
collaboration.173 These key areas include authentication, automated indicator sharing, 
conformity assessment, cybersecurity workforce, data analytics, alignment with the 
Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA), international impacts and 
alignment, supply chain risk management, and technical privacy standards. The 
automated sharing of indicator information can provide organizations with timely, 
actionable information that they can use to detect and respond to cybersecurity events as 
they are occurring. Sharing indicators based on information that is discovered prior to and 
during incident response activities enables other organizations to deploy measures to 
detect, mitigate, and possibly prevent attacks as they occur.174 
To address the privacy policy gaps that were identified in the previous chapter, 
NIST has held a two-day workshop in April to work through technical standards gaps 
issues. The focus was to advance privacy engineering as a foundation for the 
identification of technical standards and best practices that could be developed to mitigate 
the impact of cybersecurity activities on individuals’ privacy or civil liberties.175 The 
objective is to provide a standards-based tool along with privacy engineering practices 
that will help to evaluate the privacy posture of existing systems, enable the creation of 
173 “NIST Roadmap for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.”  
174 Ibid. 
175 NIST, “Summary of the Privacy Engineering Workshop at the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology April 9–10, 2014,” NIST, accessed August 2, 2014, 
http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/upload/privacy-workshop-summary-052114.pdf.  
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new systems that mitigate the risk of privacy harm and address privacy risks in a 
measurable way within an organization’s overall risk management process. NIST will 
engage a broad community of stakeholders to facilitate this work. The outcome of the 
workshop is a report that identifies challenges in privacy engineering, and proposes a 
framework for understanding privacy risk and a methodology for designing privacy-
enabled systems that would support outcome-driven privacy design and engineering 
practices. More workshops will be held to continue this body of work. 
E. TECHNOLOGY  
1. Enabling Cybersecurity Information Sharing 
There are many technologies needed to enable a successful cyber information-
sharing capability. These technologies may include user-facing capabilities such as 
portals, content and document management, collaboration, and content discovery. Other 
technologies include infrastructure capabilities such as service oriented architecture 
integration services, identity control and access management (ICAM) and data tagging, 
structured languages to provide common formats and support automated data exchange, 
and cross domain solutions to enable sharing across multiple security domains.  
The Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) is an example of a 
successful implementation of an information-sharing architecture. HSIN is the trusted 
network for homeland security mission operations to share Sensitive but unclassified 
(SBU) information. Federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, international and private sector 
homeland security partners use HSIN to manage operations, analyze data, send alerts and 
notices, and in general, share the information they need to do their jobs.176  
The National Cyber Protection System Information Sharing (NCPS-IS) is the 
platform being developed by DHS for cybersecurity related information-sharing for 
176 “Homeland Security Information Network–Intelligence,” Department of Homeland Security, 
accessed August 21, 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/hsin-intelligence (accessed August 21, 2014). 
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public and private organizations.177 The National Cybersecurity Protection System 
(NCPS) Program is an integrated system of Intrusion Detection, Intrusion Prevention, 
analytical, and information-sharing capabilities used to defend the Federal Government’s 
information technology infrastructure from cyber threats.178 NCPS-IS will help prevent 
cyber incidents from occurring through improved discovery of, dissemination of, and 
access to threat, vulnerability, and mitigation information. It will help reduce the time to 
respond to incidents through improved collaboration and coordination. Further, it will 
provide auditing of the information that is shared to ensure quality control and foster 
increased information-sharing through increased transparency and privacy assurance. The 
end result of increased sharing through the NCPS-IS will be an increase in the 
understanding of the entire threat to U.S. network systems and a cohesive and 
comprehensive defensive stance against network attacks.   
2. Data Quality and Actionable Intelligence 
Information quality is the degree to which information meets the needs of its 
users. Sometimes information which is high quality for one user is low quality for 
another. Further, the data that is shared must be actionable. In an October 2013 report on 
Threat Intelligence, Gartner essentially points out that most vendors are offering Cyber 
Threat information–not cyber threat intelligence and that “only a comparative few 
(vendors)…provide true intelligence capabilities.”179 Gartner defines cyber threat 
intelligence as “Evidence-based knowledge, including context, mechanisms, indicators, 
implications and actionable advice about an existing or emerging menace or hazard to 
assets that can be used to inform decisions regarding the subject’s response to that 
menace or hazard.”  
177 “Einstein 3 Accelerated Privacy Impact Assessment,” Department of Homeland Security, accessed 
September 15, 2014, 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy/PIAs/PIA%20NPPD%20E3A%2020130419%2
0FINAL%20signed.pdf.  
178 Department of Homeland Security, National Cybersecurity Protection System (NCPS) Information 
Sharing Concept of Operations. Washington, DC: DHS. 
179 iSight Partners, What is Cyber Threat Intelligence and Why Do I Need It? Dallas: iSIGHT Partners 
Inc., 2014).  
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Cyber threat intelligence needs to include much more than raw data. It requires 
rich contextual information that can only be created with the application of human 
analysis. This contextual information includes an understanding of the past, present and 
future tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) of a wide variety of adversaries. It must 
also include the linkage between the technical indicators (e.g., IP addresses and domains 
associated with threats or hashes that “fingerprint” malicious files), adversaries, their 
motivations and intents, and information about who is being targeted. It also involves the 
identification and ongoing monitoring of threat actors and integration with analysts to 
develop the finished intelligence.  
Organizations need to merge intelligence that is gathered through human analysis 
with technical intelligence. This will provide the rich, accurate and actionable 
intelligence that can inform decision makers. The technical intelligence can include such 
things as open-source data, indicators scraped from the underground and analysis of 
various malware toolkits, system log data, and information shared from industry groups 
or other sharing partners. 
3. Cyber Standards 
For cybersecurity information to be of high quality for an organization to take 
action on it, the information must be accessible, complete, accurate, relevant, coherent 
and valid. Furthermore, it must be in a format that can be understood by a person or be 
machine readable by a system. In order to address the machine readable format, the 
recent development of cyber threat sharing standards such as Structured Threat 
Information eXpression (STIX) and Incident Object Definition (IODEF) as well as 
Mandiant’s OpenIOC (Indicators of Compromise) will enable application developers to 
utilize these standards to enable sharing.   
According to Verizon, one must rely on evidence as for any investigation.180 
Some of the most important evidence is through gathering indicators of compromise 
(IOCs). IOC’s are identifiable events and artifacts that suggest a security incident 
occurred. Consistently collecting and maintaining the right data sources provides an 
180 Verizon, 2013 Verizon Data Breach Investigation Report (New York: Verizon, 2013).  
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organization with a resource from which to mine for IOCs, and a basic foundation for a 
stronger investigation. 
The problem with these standards is that there may be political barriers to which 
are the best standards to be using for information-sharing. CNCI-5 has provided the 
funding for the development of Mitre’s Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX) 
and is the main format of how the cyber operation centers are sharing information. The 
problem with the use of STIX as the standard to use for sharing cyber threat information 
is that if other organizations-for example international centers-want to share with federal 
centers and they do not use STIX, it will be hard to share.   
F. THE ROLE OF THE INFORMATION SHARING AND ANALYSIS 
CENTERS 
In 1996, the Clinton administration created the President’s Commission on 
Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) to study the U.S. critical infrastructures, 
determine vulnerabilities and propose a strategy to protect the nation.181 A key finding of 
the PCCIP in its 1997 report examining the vulnerabilities in the critical infrastructures is 
the need for information-sharing through a public-private partnership to better prepare to 
combat cyber threats. Building on the recommendations of the PCCIP, the Clinton 
Administration issued Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD 63) in May 1998 as the 
centerpiece of the Administration’s policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection. This 
policy defined the United States critical infrastructure, as ‘those physical and cyber-based 
systems essential to the minimum operations of the economy and government. PDD 63 
further defined these systems into six initial areas; telecommunications, energy, banking 
and finance, transportation, water systems and emergency services, both government and 
private. PDD 63 recognized the important role of the private sector as the owners and 
operators of nearly all elements of the critical infrastructure in protecting the nation’s 
cyber well-being set to developing partnerships with industry to improve information-
sharing on vulnerabilities in networked systems, best practices and incidents as a means 
to reduce the potential threats that existed at that time. To facilitate this information-
181 Rak, Information Sharing in the Cyber Age, 50. 
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sharing, PDD 63 charged the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection 
and Counter-Terrorism to encourage the creation of private-sector Information Sharing 
and Analysis Centers (ISACs) comprised of the sectors of the critical infrastructure. 
Federal Agencies were designated as Sector Liaisons with related industry ISACs to 
assist with problems related to their sector. The ISACs enable industry within a specific 
sector to share information on threats, vulnerabilities, and information about an attack. 
This allows the flow of information between the public and private sector on threats and 
vulnerabilities, therefore accelerating response. PDD-63 was updated in 2003 with 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-7 to reaffirm the partnership mission 
better protecting our critical infrastructures and to help minimize vulnerabilities; the DHS 
established ISAC’s to allow critical sectors to share information and work together to 
help better protect the economy. 
Today there are 18 ISACs for critical infrastructure. Of all of the ISACs, one 
stands out among the rest when it comes to a successful approach to cyber information-
sharing. That ISAC is the Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center 
(FS-ISAC). The FS-ISAC was established by the financial services sector in response to 
1998’s PDD-63 and co-ordinates security collaboration among banks.182 The FS-ISAC is 
a not-for-profit organization formed to serve the needs of the financial services industry 
for the dissemination of physical and cybersecurity, threat, vulnerability, incident, and 
solution information. Later, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7 updated the 
directive.183 The update mandates that the public and private sectors share information 
about physical and cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities to help protect U.S. critical 
infrastructure. 
Another ISAC that is emerging as a leader in cyber information-sharing is the 
COMMs ISAC. The COMMs ISAC’s mission is to facilitate voluntary collaboration and 
information-sharing among Government and industry in support of Executive Order 
182 Antone Gonsalves, “How Retailers can Boost Security through Information Sharing,” CXO Media, 
accessed August 21, 2014, http://www.csoonline.com/article/2156060/data-protection/how-retailers-can-
boost-security-through-information-sharing.html.  
183 Lech Janczewski and Andrew M. Colarik, Cyber Warfare and Cyber Terrorism (Hershey, PA: IGI 
Global, 2008). 
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12472 and the national critical infrastructure protection goals of Presidential Decision 
Directive 63 (PDD-63); to gather information on vulnerabilities, threats, intrusions, and 
anomalies from multiple sources; and to perform analysis with the goal of averting or 
mitigating impact on the telecommunications infrastructure.184 
G. NIST CYBER FRAMEWORK AS A WAY FORWARD 
Since Executive Order 13636 was issued, NIST has played a convening role in 
developing the Framework, drawing heavily on standards, guidelines, and best practices 
already available to address key cybersecurity needs. NIST also relied on organizations 
and individuals with experience in reducing cybersecurity risk and managing critical 
infrastructure. Organizations that are part of the critical infrastructure can use the 
Framework to better manage and reduce its cybersecurity risks.  
Not all critical infrastructure organizations have a mature program and the 
technical expertise in place to identify, assess, and reduce cybersecurity risk. Many have 
not had the resources to keep up with the latest cybersecurity advances and challenges as 
they balance risks to their organizations. NIST intends for the Framework to be a basic, 
flexible, and adaptable tool for managing and reducing cybersecurity risks. It is intended 
to be a living document and will continue to be updated and improved as industry 
provides feedback on implementation. As the Framework is put into practice, lessons 
learned will be integrated into future versions. This will ensure it is meeting the needs of 
critical infrastructure owners and operators in a dynamic and challenging environment of 
new threats, risks, and solutions. NIST will also hold one or more workshops and focused 
meetings on specific areas for development, alignment, and collaboration. 
The NIST Cybersecurity Framework is just a piece of the puzzle in the evolution 
of cybersecurity, one in which the balance is shifting to proactive risk-management 
standards. While the Framework is voluntary, organizations across industries may gain 
significant benefits by adopting the guidelines. According to Price Waterhouse Coopers, 
for most organizations, whether they are owners, operators, or suppliers for critical 
184 “National Cyber Incident Response Plan,” Department of Homeland Security, accessed September 
15, 2014, http://www.federalnewsradio.com/pdfs/NCIRP_Interim_Version_September_2010.pdf.  
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infrastructure, the NIST Cybersecurity Framework may be well worth adopting solely for 
its stated goal of improving risk-based security.185 But it also can deliver ancillary 
benefits that include effective collaboration and communication of security posture with 
executives and industry organizations, as well as potential future improvements in legal 
exposure and even assistance with regulatory compliance. 
A guiding principle of the Framework is collaboration to share information and 
improve cybersecurity practices and threat intelligence. A recent report by Price 
Waterhouse Coopers (PwC), shows that companies with highly effective security 
practices make it a point to collaborate with others to advance security and threat 
awareness. One of the most effective collaboration methods is participation in 
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs), which have gained traction in 
security-forward industries like financial services. PwC recommends that organizations 
actively participate in ISACs appropriate to their industry.186 
According to Deloitte, even though adoption of NIST’s cybersecurity framework 
for critical infrastructure providers is currently voluntary, CIOs who opt to apply it to 
enterprise risk management practices may improve their ability to calibrate not just their 
organizations’ cyber risk, but also business risk more broadly, while more efficiently 
allocating the information security budget.187 
The Framework means little, if it doesn’t get adopted by industry though. In a 
recent report from the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, the authors claim 
that the Cybersecurity Framework threatens to undermine this largely functioning system 
by imposing a brittle, technocratic standard that benefits specific interests and diminishes 
the incentives for cybersecurity innovation.188 Further, they argue that instead of a 
185 PricewaterhouseCoopers, Why You Should Adopt the NIST Cybersecurity Framework  (London: 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, May 2014) http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/increasing-it-
effectiveness/publications/assets/adopt-the-nist.pdf. 
186 Ibid. 
187 Deloitte, “NIST Cyber Security Framework: 4 Steps for CIOs,” Wall Street Journal, January 14, 
2014, http://deloitte.wsj.com/cio/2014/01/14/nist-cyber-security-framework-4-steps-cios-can-take-now/. 
188 Eli Dourado and Andrea Castillo, Why the Cybersecurity Framework Will Make Us Less Secure 
(Fairfax, VA: Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 2014).  
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government-driven, technocratic solution, cybersecurity insurance is an attractive 
solution to the problem of critical infrastructure protection. Insurance coverage can be 
flexible and tailored to specific needs and would incentivize firms to consistently 
improve their internal cybersecurity so as to keep premiums manageable. The problem 
they recognize is that the insurance market is still underdeveloped.  
Critical Infrastructure owners and operators must weigh cybersecurity costs and 
benefits against other business and operational requirements, on the basis of their 
particular market environment, and within existing fiscal or operational regulatory 
boundaries.189 To address the concerns of adoption, the DHS Integrated Task Force (ITF) 
performed a study to recommend a set of incentives designed to promote adoption of the 
Cybersecurity Framework, evaluate the benefits and relative effectiveness of each of the 
incentives in promoting adoption of the Framework, and to determine which of the 
incentives require legislation and which can be provided under existing laws.190 There 
are 14 broad categories of incentives to include things such as expedited security 
clearance processes, grants insurance, and tax incentives. For Information Sharing, 
incentives were identified for ensuring that framework owners and operators are 
informed of relevant real-time cyber threat information. For liability considerations, 
reduced liability in exchange for improved cybersecurity or increased liability for the 
consequences of poor security were identified.   
As the Framework is in the beginning stages for implementation and adoption, 
there is more work that needs to be done. Success of the Framework along with many of 
these incentives is dependent on compliance with the identified cybersecurity standards 
and practices and the adoption of new technologies, processes, and procedures. There is 
much more work that can be studied in this area. 
189 “Cybersecurity Incentives Material,” Department of Homeland Security, accessed August 21, 
2014, http://www.amwa.net/galleries/default-file/CybersecurityIncentivesMaterial.pdf. 
190 DHS, Incentives Study Analytic Report. 
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H. CONCLUSION 
Three major conclusions can be made from this study. The first conclusion is that 
the exchange of cybersecurity information is critical in order to help organizations 
mitigate the security threats they face. With more and more sophisticated cyber criminals 
it is difficult, costly and ineffective to fight online attacks alone. Having the ability to 
connect and share information about existing and emerging threats could measurably 
improve an organization’s cyber defenses. 
Second, many organizations are either fully or partially participating in the 
exchange of cyber threat intelligence. However, there is much that needs to be done to 
improve collaboration and benefit from information that identifies patterns and trends 
that reveal ongoing attacks and future hazards. According to The White House, the goal 
is for the government to be a reliable information-sharing partner, but only one of many. 
Companies that are targeted by criminals and nation state actors should establish 
information-sharing channels with the National Cybersecurity & Communications 
Integration Center at the Department of Homeland Security, law enforcement agencies 
such as the FBI and Secret Service, and with other relevant agencies; however, they 
should also build information-sharing relationships with private sector partners and 
organizations.191 
Finally, sharing should be voluntary, in order to encourage true cooperation. 
Voluntary sharing allows organizations with privacy concerns to avoid sharing their 
information, while still receiving the information they need from the government. Strong 
liability protection is critical for those companies who share information and must be 
provided if a company is going to share with the government. The information shared by 
the private sector must be exempt from Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. If 
shared information is exempted from FOIA and regulatory use, a company can share 
important data without fear that its competitive advantages will be lost to other firms or 
used by regulators to impose more rules or costs.   
191 Daniel, “Getting Serious about Information Sharing for Cybersecurity.” 
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Lastly, the government must share information with the private sector much more 
than it currently does in order to build trust by the private sector. President Obama’s 
executive order 13636 and the NIST Cybersecurity Framework is a step in the right 
direction, but more must be done. With the evolution of the technical standards such as 
STIX and TAXII, we must further the development efforts in the automation of cyber 
information-sharing in order to get actionable intelligence shared at net-speed. Finally, 
with the development of the DHS NCPS-IS, the nation’s cyber enterprise posture will 
have increased situational awareness through the sharing of cyber status and cyber risk 
among public and private participants. 
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